Memoir, Correspondence, And Miscellanies, From The Papers Of Thomas Jefferson
Chapter 250 : 2. To enable them, in their corporate capacities, to receive grants of land; and so fa

2. To enable them, in their corporate capacities, to receive grants of land; and so far, is against the laws of _Mortmain_.*

* Though the const.i.tution controls the laws of Mortmain, so far as to permit Congress itself to hold lands for certain purposes, yet not so far as to permit them to communicate a similar right to other corporate bodies.

3. To make alien subscribers capable of holding lands; and so far, is against the laws of Alienage.

4. To transmit these lands, on the death of a proprietor, to a certain line of successors; and so far, changes the course of Descents.

5. To put the lands out of the reach of forfeiture or escheat; and so far, is against the laws of _Forfeiture_ and _Escheat_.

6. To transmit personal chattels to successors in a certain line; and so far, is against the laws of Distribution.

7. To give them the sole and exclusive right of banking under the national authority; and so far, is against the laws of Monopoly.

8. To communicate to them a power to make laws paramount to the laws of the States; for so they must be construed, to protect the inst.i.tution from the control of the State legislatures; and so, probably, they will be construed.

I consider the foundation of the const.i.tution as laid on this ground, that all powers not delegated to the United States by the const.i.tution nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States or to the people.' (Twelfth amendment.) To take a single step beyond the boundaries thus specially drawn around the powers of Congress, is to take possession of a boundless field of power, no longer susceptible of any definition.

The incorporation of a bank, and the powers a.s.sumed by this bill, have not, in my opinion, been delegated to the United States by the const.i.tution.

I. They are not among the powers specially, enumerated. For these are,

1. A power to _lay taxes_ for the purpose of paying the debts of the United States. But no debt is paid by this bill, nor any tax laid. Were it a bill to raise money, its origination in the Senate would condemn it by the const.i.tution.

2. To 'borrow money.' But this bill neither borrows money, nor insures the borrowing it. The proprietors of the bank will be just as free as any other money-holders, to lend or not to lend their money to the public. The operation proposed in the bill, first to lend them two millions, and then borrow them back again cannot change the nature of the latter act, which will still be a payment and not a loan, call it by what name you please.

3. 'To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the States, and with the Indian tribes.' To erect a bank, and to regulate commerce, are very different acts. He who erects a bank creates a subject of commerce in its bills: so does he who makes a bushel of wheat, or digs a dollar out of the mines. Yet neither of these persons regulates commerce thereby. To make a thing which may be bought and sold, is not to prescribe regulations for buying and selling. Besides, if this were an exercise of the power of regulating commerce, it would be void, as extending as much to the internal commerce of every State, as to its external. For the power given to Congress by the const.i.tution, does not extend to the internal regulation, of the commerce of a State (that is to say, of the commerce between citizen and citizen), which remains exclusively with its own legislature; but to its external commerce only, that is to say, its commerce with another State, or with foreign nations, or with the Indian tribes. Accordingly, the bill does not propose the measure as a 'regulation of trade,' but as 'productive of considerable advantage to trade.'

Still less are these powers covered by any other of the special enumerations.

II. Nor are they within either of the general phrases, which are the two following.

1. 'To lay taxes to provide for the general welfare of the United States'; that is to say, 'to lay taxes for the purpose of providing for the general welfare.' For the laying of taxes is the power, and the general welfare the purpose for which the power is to be exercised.

Congress are not to lay taxes, _ad libitum_, for any purpose they please: but only to pay the debts, or provide for the welfare of the Union. In like manner, they are not to do any thing they please, to provide for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose.

To consider the latter phrase, not as describing the purpose of the first, but as giving a distinct and independent power to do any act they please, which might be for the good of the Union, would render all the preceding and subsequent enumerations of power completely useless.

It would reduce the whole instrument to a single phrase, that of inst.i.tuting a Congress with power to do whatever would be for the good of the United States; and as they would be the sole judges of the good or evil, it would be also a power to do whatever evil they pleased. It is an established rule of construction, where a phrase will bear either of two meanings, to give it that which will allow some meaning to the other parts of the instrument, and not that which will render all the others useless. Certainly no such universal power was meant to be given them. It was intended to lace them up straitly within the enumerated powers, and those without which, as means, these powers could not be carried into effect. It is known that the very power now proposed as a means, was rejected as an end by the convention which formed the const.i.tution. A proposition was made to them, to authorize Congress to open parials, and an amendatory one, to empower them to incorporate.

But the whole was rejected; and one of the reasons of rejection urged in debate was, that they then would have a power to erect a bank, which would render the great cities, where there were prejudices and jealousies on that subject, adverse to the reception of the const.i.tution.

2. The second general phrase is, 'to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution the enumerated powers.' But they can all be carried into execution without a bank. A bank, therefore, is not necessary, and consequently, not authorized by this phrase.

It has been much urged, that a bank will give great facility or convenience in the collection of taxes. Suppose this were true: yet the const.i.tution allows only the means which are 'necessary' not those which are merely 'convenient' for effecting the enumerated powers. If such a lat.i.tude of construction be allowed to this phrase, as to give any non-enumerated power, it will go to every one; for there is no one which ingenuity may not torture into a convenience, in some way or other, to some one of so long a list of enumerated powers. It would swallow up all the delegated powers, and reduce the whole to one phrase, as before observed. Therefore it was, that the const.i.tution restrained them to the necessary means, that is to say, to those means without which the grant of the power would be nugatory.

But let us examine this 'convenience,' and see what it is. The report on this subject, page 2, states the only general convenience to be, the preventing the transportation and re-transportation of money between the States and the treasury. (For I pa.s.s over the increase of circulating medium ascribed to it as a merit, and which, according to my ideas of paper money, is clearly a demerit.) Every State will have to pay a sum of tax-money into the treasury; and the treasury will have to pay in every State a part of the interest on the public debt, and salaries to the officers of government resident in that State. In most of the States, there will be still a surplus of tax-money, to come up to the seat of government, for the officers residing there. The payments of interest and salary in each State, may be made by treasury orders on the state collector. This will take up the greater part of the money he has collected in his State and consequently prevent the great ma.s.s of it from being drawn out of the state. If there be a balance of commerce in favor of that State, against the one in which the government resides, the surplus of taxes will be remitted by the bills of exchange drawn for that commercial balance. And so it must be if there were a bank. But if there be no balance of commerce, either direct or circuitous, all the banks in the world could not bring us the surplus of taxes but in the form of money. Treasury orders, then, and bills of exchange, may prevent the displacement of the main ma.s.s of the money collected, without the aid of any bank: and where these fail, it cannot be prevented even with that aid.

Perhaps, indeed, bank bills may be a more convenient vehicle than treasury orders. But a little difference in the degree of convenience, cannot const.i.tute the necessity which the const.i.tution makes the ground for a.s.suming any non-enumerated power.

Besides; the existing banks will, without doubt, enter into arrangements for lending their agency, and the more favorable, as there will be a compet.i.tion among them for it. Whereas, this bill delivers us up bound to the national bank, who are free to refuse all arrangements but on their own terms, and the public not free, on such refusal to employ any other bank. That of Philadelphia, I believe, now does this business by their post notes, which, by an arrangement with the treasury, are paid by any State collector to whom they are presented. This expedient alone, suffices to prevent the existence of that necessity which may justify the a.s.sumption of a non-enumerated power, as a means for carrying into effect an enumerated one. The thing may be done, and has been done, and well done, without this a.s.sumption; therefore, it does not stand on that degree of necessity which can honestly justify it.

It may be said, that a bank, whose bills would have a currency all over the States, would be more convenient than one whose currency is limited to a single State. So it would be still more convenient, that there should be a bank whose bills should have a currency all over the world.

But it does not follow from this superior conveniency, that there exists any where a power to establish such a bank, or that the world may not go on very well without it. Can it be thought that the const.i.tution intended, that for a shade or two of convenience, more or less, Congress should be authorized to break down the most ancient and fundamental laws of the several States, such as those against mortmain, the laws of alienage, the rules of descent, the acts of distribution, the laws of escheat and forfeiture, and the laws of monopoly. Nothing but a necessity invincible by any other means, can justify such a prostration of laws, which const.i.tute the pillars of our whole system of jurisprudence. Will Congress be too strait-laced to carry the const.i.tution into honest effect, unless they may pa.s.s over the foundation laws of the State governments, for the slightest convenience to theirs?

The negative of the President is the s.h.i.+eld provided by the const.i.tution, to protect against the invasions of the legislature, 1.

the rights of the Executive; 2. of the Judiciary; 3. of the States and State legislatures. The present is the case of a right remaining exclusively with the States, and is, consequently, one of those intended by the const.i.tution to be placed under his protection.

It must be added, however, that unless the President's mind, on a view of every thing which is urged for and against this bill, is tolerably clear that it is unauthorized by the const.i.tution, if the pro and the con hang so even as to balance his judgment, a just respect for the wisdom of the legislature would naturally decide the balance in favor of their opinion. It is chiefly for cases where they are clearly misled by error, ambition, or interest, that the const.i.tution has placed a check in the negative of the President.

Th: Jefferson.

February 15, 1791.