The Journal of Negro History
Chapter 56 : "This leading sentiment of mediation was indorsed by the Union men of both Houses

"This leading sentiment of mediation was indorsed by the Union men of both Houses of the Legislature.... Some may say, why did not the Kentucky Legislature go for coercion? For two reasons: First, some States, it is true had seceded from the Union, but war had not actually commenced: second, the men at that time who would have undertaken to force coercion upon the Legislature would have been in the hopeless minority and would have immediately given a majority to the secessionists. It would have ended in total destruction to the cause of the Union in the State. Those resolutions were for two purposes. In good faith they were intended to compromise all difference between the States, and if possible to restore peace between sections. If that failed, they were intended to hold, if possible, our meagre majority until the people could act and we had no doubt that when they did speak it would be in unmistakable tones for the preservation of the Union."[26]

No action was taken on these resolutions, but on the eleventh of February there was pa.s.sed a joint measure, ent.i.tled "Resolutions Declaring action by the Legislature on political affairs unnecessary and inexpedient at this time,"[27] These resolutions mentioned the great danger which environed the Union, asked the Confederates to stay the work of secession and protested against coercion. The last resolution favored the calling of a convention to amend the Const.i.tution of the United States. Significant too for the Unionists were the last words: "It is unnecessary and inexpedient for the Legislature to take any further action on the subject at the present time, and as an evidence of the sincerity and good faith of our propositions for an adjustment and our expression of devotion to the Union and the desire for its preservation Kentucky awaits with great solicitude the responses from her sister States."[28]

Neutrality, however, became the accepted policy of so many that it proved to be dangerous. The Union State Committee, in drawing up on the eighteenth of April a resolution to please all, seemingly pledged the State to join the South. These resolutions were severely criticised by the Unionists, especially that part which says: "What the future destiny of Kentucky may be we cannot with certainty foresee. But if the enterprise announced in the proclamation of the President should at any time hereafter a.s.sume the aspect of a war for overrunning and subjugation of the seceding States, then Kentucky ought to take her stand for the South."

[29] Many thought that this obligated Kentucky to go with the South.

Unionists of other States considered it a victory for the Confederacy.

This committee, however, stipulated this proposition to satisfy those sympathizers with the South, who believed all the bad reports concerning the functionaries of the Federal Government, circulated by the leaders of the Confederacy. Hence, they said in this proposition not that Kentucky would go with the South, but if at any time thereafter the President's proclamation should a.s.sume the aspect of war, it would do so. They evidently did not believe that it had or would a.s.sume such an aspect. They were also trying to pacify those who misunderstood the issues of "subjugation" and "coercion."[30] The relation of the States to the Union was yet a problem to many a statesman. Many thought that the colonists when in a state of nature came together and agreed to a compact, giving up some of their sovereignty and retaining the other, and, therefore, had the right to withdraw at pleasure, carrying a part of the national property with them. Such thinkers contended too that the Union had no right to "coerce" a seceded State. Calhoun had said that because the Union was a compact it could be broken; on the other hand, Jackson had said that because it was a compact it could not be broken. Now it was difficult for Kentuckians to decide who was right. That the committee had no intention of going with the Confederacy may be seen from the following declaration: "Seditious leaders in the midst of us now appeal to her (Kentucky) to furnish troops to uphold those combinations against the government of the Union. Will she comply with this appeal? Ought she to comply with it? We answer, no."[31]

While these things were going on, the great question of Fort Sumter was before the people. When the fort was finally bombarded and Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand troops Gov. Magoffin politely refused to comply.

His reply was: "I say emphatically Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States."[32] He had already been much moved by the large vote given the delegates to the Border States Convention, indicating such a growth of Union sentiment that he called the legislature together, hoping to win the day for secession by changing the policy of the State from mediatorial to armed neutrality, resisting all forces, whether Confederate or Federal, which might bring war into the State. The body met on the sixteenth of May, pa.s.sed a resolution of mediatorial neutrality and approved the Governor's refusal to furnish troops under the existing circ.u.mstances.[33] This, however, did not mean that the legislature was in sympathy with the efforts of the Governor to support the Southern cause. Writing to Gen. Scott, John J. Crittenden explained it thus:

"The position of Kentucky and the relation she occupies toward the government of the Union is not, I fear, understood at Was.h.i.+ngton. It ought to be well understood. Very important consequences may depend upon it and upon her proper treatment. Unfortunately for us our Governor does not sympathize with Kentucky in respect to secession.

His opinions and feelings incline him strongly to the side of the South. His answer to the requisition for troops was in terms hasty and unbecoming and does not correspond with the usual and gentlemanly courtesy. But while she regretted the language of his answer, Kentucky acquiesced in his declining to furnish the troops called for, and she did so not because she loved the Union less but she feared that if she had parted with those troops and sent them to serve in your ranks, she would have been overwhelmed by secessionists at home, and severed from the Union. And it was to preserve substantially and ultimately our connection with the Union that induced us to acquiesce in the partial infraction of it by our Governor's refusal of the troops required. This was the most prevailing and general motive. To this may be added the strong indisposition of our people to a civil war with the South, and the apprehended consequences of a civil war within our state and among our people.... I think Kentucky's excuse a good one and that under all the circ.u.mstances of a complicated case she is rendering better service in her present position than she could by becoming an active party in the contest."[34]

The fact is that secession had little chance in Kentucky after public opinion found expression. Neutrality early became the order of the day.

The elections of 1861 were significant in that they gave the people a chance to express their will. It should be borne in mind that the legislature of 1859 was elected when the question of union or disunion was not before the people. Now in 1861 they had to elect members to the Border State Convention, a new legislature, and congressmen to represent Kentucky at the special session called by President Lincoln. In all these elections, Unionists won. Some historians like Smith and Shaler[35] seem to think that the State had pledged itself to remain unconditionally neutral, that these elections had no particular bearing on the situation and that if a "sovereignty convention" had been called, secession would have won. These writers do not seem to see that the people of Kentucky, although nominally neutral, desired to remain with the Union. Doubtless a better statement is that, although the election of 1861 showed that a large majority of the people were in favor of the Union, the Union leaders did not show so in the early part of the year and neutrality was adopted not as an end but as a means that triumph over the enemies of the Union might finally be a.s.sured.[36] We easily see now that there was not much danger of secession, but the Unionists could not see it so well at that time. Smith and Shaler doubtless exaggerate the situation, for what danger of secession could there have been when the people had elected the Union candidates for the Border State Convention to be convened at Frankfort on May 27, when they sent nine Unionists out of the ten congressmen to represent them in the special session of Congress, and when on the 5th of the following August, after the battle of Bull Run, they elected to the State Legislature 103 Unionists out of 141 members.[37] The calling of a convention then would have made little difference, if the people had chosen a majority of Unionists to represent them in other bodies. How can one conclude then that they would have elected seceders to represent them in a "sovereignty convention"? Hodge states that the sympathizers with the Confederacy did not contest to any considerable extent the elections of August, 1861, and consequently the supporters of the Federal Government were in the ascendency in the next legislature. He seems to indicate that the Unionists used fraud, but the records show that the Secessionists, regarding it as a lost cause, in many cases withdrew their candidates.

Evidently these elections showed not only that secession was impossible but that neutrality could not last.[38]

After this sentiment began to change. Men boldly took decisive positions.

The unwieldy neutrality party then divided into three parts: those who went to the Confederate lines to aid the Southern cause; those who openly declared themselves in favor of the Union; and those sympathizers with the South, who although in favor of the seceding States, seeing that their cause was hopeless, advocated peaceful separation and finally, when that failed, a compromise peace between the two sections.[39] The Union party, though unalterably opposed to the abolitionists and not primarily attached to the Union because of antagonism to slavery, gradually acquiesced in the policy of the Federal Government with respect to that inst.i.tution. This party first reached the position that Negroes taken from the Confederates could with propriety be disposed of as contraband of war and many of its adherents grew more favorable to the policy of general emanc.i.p.ation.

It was soon evident that war could not long be kept out of the State. As early as April, 1861, troops for service in the Confederacy were organized in Kentucky. This movement was somewhat accelerated by an act of the legislature providing that the arms supplied to the troops should not be used against either section and that the State companies as well as the Home Guards should take the same oath as the officers requiring fidelity to the Const.i.tution.[40] At this point many Kentuckians of proslavery tendencies were forced out of their natural position and driven into the Confederate ranks. Among these was S. B. Buckner, who went South to command about ten thousand secessionists, recruited under the leaders.h.i.+p of Colonels Roger W. Hanson, Lloyd Tilghman, and W. D.

Lannon at Camp Boone.[41]

The Governor refused to furnish Lincoln troops but he was in touch with the Confederacy, doing all he could to equip soldiers for its service,[42]

though not exactly openly, as that would have been sufficient excuse for the Unionists who desired to help the Union. The Unionists who saw all of this going on desired to arm and organize their forces but they were handicapped in that the commander of the State guard was a Secessionist and care had been taken to hold the military forces for the South. In consequence of this difficulty Lincoln was secretly appealed to for arms, which were s.h.i.+pped to cities on the Ohio River for secret distribution among the Unionists of Kentucky as the opportunity would permit.[43] The Secessionists had referred to these guns as the first so-called violation of neutrality. The Unionists defended themselves on the ground that since the Governor and his whole machine were about in the ranks of the Confederates they were justified in doing almost anything to defend the State. Shaler says that the action on both sides was almost simultaneous and that the actual infringement of the neutrality proclamation issued by the Governor was due to the action of Polk and Zollicoffer and the simultaneous invasion of the State some hundreds of miles apart shows that the rupture of the neutrality of Kentucky was deliberately planned by the Confederate authorities.[44]

The invasion by Polk in September produced great excitement. The legislature was then in session and pa.s.sed a resolution that the invaders be expelled, and that the Governor call out the military force of the State and place the same under the command of Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden.

The resolutions were vetoed by the Governor but pa.s.sed by a vote of two thirds.[45] The desired proclamation was issued and soon sufficient men to form forty regiments answered the call.[46] Making further response to the invasion of the State by the Confederates, the legislature ordered that the United States flag be raised over the capitol at Frankfort, and by a resolution which "affirmed" distinctly, though not directly, the doctrine of States' rights placed Kentucky in political and military a.s.sociation with the North.[47]

WILLIAM T. McKINNEY

FOOTNOTES:

[1] See Debates in Congress.

[2] Marshall, Speech in Was.h.i.+ngton on the Nomination of Breckenridge and Lane, p. 3.

[3] Speech of John Stephenson on the state of the Union in the House of Representatives, January 30, 1861.

[4] Bartlett, "Presidential Candidates in 1860," pp. 344-345.

[5] Speech of Hon. J. C. Breckenridge delivered at Ashland, Kentucky, p. 9.

[6] Speech of J. C. Breckenridge on Executive Usurpation, July 16, 1861.

[7] "The Frankfort Commonwealth," August 21, 1861.

[8] These were some of the most intellectual and aristocratic men of the State. Collins exaggerates, however, when he says that few leading men opposed secession. See Collins, "History of Kentucky," I, 82.

[9] Speed, "The Union Cause in Kentucky," 36.

[10] Ibid., 36.

[11] Ibid., 37.

[12] Hart, "Slavery and Abolition," 65, 178, 234; Turner, "Rise of the New West," 77.

[13] Report of the American Historical a.s.sociation, 1893, pp. 219-221.

[14] Burgess, "Civil War and the Const.i.tution," I, 30.

[15] Ibid.

[16] McMaster, "History of the United States," VIII, 426-427.

[17] Rhodes, "History of the United States," III, 391.

[18] Rhodes, "History of the United States," VII, 392.

[19] Speed, "The Union Cause in Kentucky," 158-179.

[20] _House Journal_, 1861, Governor's Message, p. 10.

[21] Ibid., 11.

[22] _House Journal_, 1861, Governor's Message, p. 12.

[23] Ibid., 14.

[24] Letter of John J. Crittenden to Gen. McClellan.

[25] Speed, "The Union Cause in Kentucky," 42.

[26] Speed, "The Union Cause in Kentucky," p. 45.

[27] _House Journal_. 1861, p. 33.

[28] Ibid., 34.

[29] Speed, "The Union Cause in Kentucky," 57.

[30] Speed, "The Union Cause in Kentucky," 58-62.

[31] Ibid., 58.