The Anti-Slavery Examiner, Omnibus
Chapter 127 : NO. 9.THE ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER.LETTER OF GERRIT SMITH, TO HON. HENRY CLAY.NEW YORK: P

NO. 9.

THE ANTI-SLAVERY EXAMINER.

LETTER

OF

GERRIT SMITH,

TO

HON. HENRY CLAY.

NEW YORK:

PUBLISHED BY THE AMERICAN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, NO. 143 Na.s.sAU STREET.

----- 1839.

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LETTER.

PETERBORO, MARCH 21, 1839.

HON. HENRY CLAY:

DEAR SIR,

In the Annual Meeting of the American Colonization Society, held in the Capitol in the city of Was.h.i.+ngton, December, 1835, you commented on a speech made by myself, the previous autumn. Your objections to that speech formed the princ.i.p.al subject matter of your remarks. Does not this fact somewhat mitigate the great presumption of which I feel myself guilty, in undertaking, all unhonored and humble as I am, to review the production of one of the most distinguished statesmen of the age?

Until the appearance of your celebrated speech on the subject of slavery, I had supposed that you cherished a sacred regard for the right of pet.i.tion. I now find, that you value it no more highly than they do, who make open war upon it. Indeed, you admit, that, in relation to this right, "there is no substantial difference between" them and yourself.

Instead of rebuking, you compliment them; and, in saying that "the majority of the Senate" would not "violate the right of pet.i.tion in any case, in which, according to its judgment, the object of the pet.i.tion could be safely or properly granted," you show to what destructive conditions you subject this absolute right. Your doctrine is, that in those cases, where the object of the pet.i.tion is such, as the supplicated party can approve, previously to any discussion of its merits--there, and there only, exists the right of pet.i.tion. For aught I see, you are no more to be regarded as the friend of this right, than is the conspicuous gentleman[A] who framed the Report on that subject, which was presented to the Senate of my state the last month. That gentleman admits the sacredness of "the right to pet.i.tion on any subject;" and yet, in the same breath, he insists on the equal sacredness of the right to refuse to attend to a pet.i.tion. He manifestly failed to bear in mind, that a right to pet.i.tion implies the correlative right to be heard. How different are the statesmen, who insist "on the right to refuse to attend to a pet.i.tion," from Him, who says, "Whoso stoppeth his ears at the cry of the poor, he also shall cry himself, but shall not be heard." And who are poor, if it be not those for whom the abolitionists cry? They must even cry by proxy. For, in the language of John Quincy Adams, the champion of the right of pet.i.tion, "The slave is not permitted to cry for mercy--to plead for pardon--to utter the shriek of peris.h.i.+ng nature for relief." It may be well to remark, that the error, which I have pointed out in the Report in question, lies in the premises of the princ.i.p.al argument of that paper; and that the correction of this error is necessarily attended with the destruction of the premises, and with the overthrow of the argument, which is built upon them.

[Footnote A: Colonel Young.]

I surely need not stop to vindicate the right of pet.i.tion. It is a natural right--one that human laws can guarantee, but can neither create nor destroy. It is an interesting fact, that the Amendment to the Federal Const.i.tution, which guarantees the right of pet.i.tion, was opposed in the Congress of 1789 as superfluous. It was argued, that this is "a self-evident, inalienable right, which the people possess," and that "it would never be called in question." What a change in fifty years!

You deny the power of Congress to abolish the inter-state traffic in human beings; and, inasmuch as you say, that the right "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states," does not include the right to prohibit and destroy commerce; and, inasmuch as it is understood, that it was in virtue of the right to regulate commerce, that Congress enacted laws to restrain our partic.i.p.ation in the "African slave trade," you perhaps also deny, that Congress had the power to enact such laws. The history of the times in which the Federal Const.i.tution was framed and adopted, justifies the belief, that the clause of that instrument under consideration conveys the power, which Congress exercised. For instance, Governor Randolph, when speaking in the Virginia Convention of 1788, of the clause which declares, that "the migration or importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the year 1808," said, "This is an exception from the power of regulating commerce, and the restriction is to continue only till 1808. Then Congress can, by the exercise of that power, prevent future importations."

Were I, however, to admit that the right "to regulate commerce," does not include the right to prohibit and destroy commerce, it nevertheless would not follow, that Congress might not prohibit or destroy certain branches of commerce. It might need to do so, in order to preserve our general commerce with a state or nation. So large a proportion of the cloths of Turkey might be fraught with the contagion of the plague, as to make it necessary for our Government to forbid the importation of all cloths from that country, and thus totally destroy one branch of our commerce with it, to the end that the other branches might be preserved.

No inconsiderable evidence that Congress has the right to prohibit or destroy a branch of commerce, is to be found in the fact, that it has done so. From March, 1794, to May, 1820, it enacted several laws, which went to prohibit or destroy, and, in the end, did prohibit or destroy the trade of this country with Africa in human beings. And, if Congress has the power to pa.s.s embargo laws, has it not the power to prohibit or destroy commerce altogether?

It is, however, wholly immaterial, whether Congress could prohibit our partic.i.p.ation in the "African slave trade," in virtue of the clause which empowers it "to regulate commerce." That the Const.i.tution does, in some one or more of its pa.s.sages, convey the power, is manifest from the testimony of the Const.i.tution itself. The first clause of the ninth section says: "The migration or importation of such persons, as any of the states now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to they year 1808." Now the implication in this clause of the existence of the power in question, is as conclusive, as would be the express and positive grant of it. You will observe, too, that the power of Congress over "migration or importation," which this clause implies, is a power not merely to "regulate," as you define the word, but to "prohibit."

It is clear, then, that Congress had the power to interdict our trade in human beings with Africa. But, in view of what has been said on that point--in view of the language of the Federal Const.i.tution--of the proceedings of the Convention, which framed it--and of the cotemporary public sentiment--is it any less clear, that Congress has the power to interdict the inter-state traffic in human beings?

There are some, who a.s.sert that the words "migration" and "importation,"

instead of referring, as I maintain they do--the former to the removal of slaves from state to state, and the latter to their introduction from Africa--are used in the Const.i.tution as synonyms, and refer exclusively to the "African slave trade." But there is surely no ground for the imputation of such utter tautology, if we recollect that the Const.i.tution was written by scholars, and that remarkable pains were taken to clear it of all superfluous words--a Committee having been appointed for that special purpose. But, it may be asked, Why, in reference to the taking of slaves from one state to another, use the word "migration," which denotes voluntary removal? One answer is--that it can be used with as much propriety in that case, as in the removal of slaves from Africa--the removal in the one case being no less involuntary than in the other. Another answer is--that the framers of the Const.i.tution selected the word "migration," because of its congruity with that of "persons," under which their virtuous shame sought to conceal from posterity the existence of seven hundred thousand slaves amongst a people, who had but recently entered upon their national career, with the solemn declaration, that "all men are created equal."

John Jay, whose great celebrity is partly owing to his very able expositions of the Const.i.tution, says: "To me, the const.i.tutional authority of the Congress to prohibit the migration _and_ importation of slaves into any of the states, does not appear questionable." If the disjunctive between "migration" and "importation" in the Const.i.tution, argues their reference to the same thing, Mr. Jay's copulative argues more strongly, that, in his judgment, they refer to different things.

The law of Congress const.i.tuting the "Territory of Orleans," was enacted in 1804. It fully recognizes the power of that body to prohibit the trade in slaves between a territory and the states. But, if Congress had this power, why had it not as clear a power to prohibit, at that time, the trade in slaves between any two of the states? It might have prohibited it, but for the const.i.tutional suspension of the exercise of the power. The term of that suspension closed, however, in 1808; and, since that year, Congress has had as full power to abolish the whole slave trade between the states, as it had in 1804 to abolish the like trade between the Territory of Orleans and the states.

But, notwithstanding the conclusive evidence, that the Const.i.tution empowers Congress to abolish the inter-state slave trade, it is incomprehensible to many, that such states as Virginia and Maryland should have consented to deprive themselves of the benefit of selling their slaves into other states. It is incomprehensible, only because they look upon such states in the light of their present character and present interests. It will no longer be so, if they will bear in mind, that slave labor was then, as it is now, unprofitable for ordinary agriculture, and that Whitney's cotton-gin, which gave great value to such labor, was not yet invented, and that the purchase of Louisiana, which has had so great an effect to extend and perpetuate the dominion of slavery, was not yet made. It will no longer be incomprehensible to them, if they will recollect, that, at the period in question, American slavery was regarded as a rapidly decaying, if not already expiring inst.i.tution. It will no longer be so, if they will recollect, how small was the price of slaves then, compared with their present value; and that, during the ten years, which followed the pa.s.sage of the Act of Virginia in 1782, legalizing manumissions, her citizens emanc.i.p.ated slaves to the number of nearly one-twentieth of the whole amount of her slaves in that year. To learn whether your native Virginia clung in the year 1787 to the inter-state traffic in human flesh, we must take our post of observation, not amongst her degenerate sons, who, in 1836, sold men, women, and children, to the amount of twenty-four millions of dollars--not amongst her President Dews, who write books in favor of breeding human stock for exportation--but amongst her Was.h.i.+ngtons, and Jeffersons, and Henrys, and Masons, who, at the period when the Const.i.tution was framed, freely expressed their abhorrence of slavery.

But, however confident you may be, that Congress has not the lawful power to abolish the branch of commerce in question; nevertheless, would the abolition of it be so clearly and grossly unconst.i.tutional, as to justify the contempt with which the numerous pet.i.tions for the measure are treated, and the impeachment of their fidelity to the Const.i.tution, and of their patriotism and purity, which the pet.i.tioners are made to endure?

I was about to take it for granted, that, although you deny the power of Congress to abolish the inter-state traffic in human beings, you do not justify the traffic--when I recollected the intimation in your speech, that there is no such traffic. For, when you speak of "the slave trade between the states," and add--"or, as it is described in abolition pet.i.tions, the traffic in human beings between the states"--do you not intimate there is no such traffic? Whence this language? Do you not believe slaves are human beings? And do you not believe that they suffer under the disruption of the dearest earthly ties, as human beings suffer? I will not detain you to hear what we of the North think of this internal slave trade. But I will call your attention to what is thought of it in your own Kentucky and in your native Virginia. Says the "Address of the Presbyterian Synod of Kentucky to the Churches in 1835:"--"Brothers and sisters, parents and children, husbands and wives, are torn asunder, and permitted to see each other no more. Those acts are daily occurring in the midst of us. The shrieks and the agony often witnessed on such occasions, proclaim with a trumpet tongue the iniquity and cruelty of the system. There is not a neighborhood where these heart-rending scenes are not displayed. There is not a village or road that does not behold the sad procession of manacled outcasts, whose chains and mournful countenances tell that they are exiled by force from all that their hearts hold dear." Says Thomas Jefferson Randolph, in the Virginia Legislature in 1832, when speaking of this trade: "It is a practice, and an increasing practice, in parts of Virginia, to rear slaves for market. How can an honourable mind, a patriot, and a lover of his country, bear to see this ancient dominion, rendered ill.u.s.trious by the n.o.ble devotion and patriotism of her sons in the cause of liberty, converted into one grand menagerie, where men are to be reared for the market like oxen for the shambles. Is it better--is it not worse than the (foreign) slave trade--that trade which enlisted the labor of the good and wise of every creed and every clime to abolish? The (foreign) trader receives the slave, a stranger in language, aspect, and manner, from the merchant who has brought him from the interior. The ties of father, mother, husband, and child, have already been rent in twain; before he receives him, his soul has become callous. But here, sir, individuals whom the master has known from infancy, whom he has seen sporting in the innocent gambols of childhood--who have been accustomed to look to him for protection, he tears from the mother's arms, and sells into a strange country--among strange people, subject to cruel taskmasters."

You are in favor of increasing the number of slave states. The terms of the celebrated "Missouri compromise" warrant, in your judgment, the increase. But, notwithstanding you admit, that this unholy compromise, in which tranquillity was purchased at the expense of humanity and righteousness, does not "in terms embrace the case," and "is not absolutely binding and obligatory;" you, nevertheless, make no attempt whatever to do away any one of the conclusive objections, which are urged against such increase. You do not attempt to show how the multiplication of slave states can consist with the const.i.tutional duty of the "United States to guarantee to every state in the Union a republican form of government," any more than if it were perfectly clear, that a government is republican under which one half of the people are lawfully engaged in buying and selling the other half; or than if the doctrine that "all men are created equal" were not the fundamental and distinctive doctrine of a republican government. You no more vindicate the proposition to enlarge the realm of slavery, than if the proposition were as obviously in harmony with, as it is opposed to the anti-slavery tenor and policy of the Const.i.tution--the rights of man--and the laws of G.o.d.

You are perhaps of the number of those, who, believing, that a state can change its Const.i.tution as it pleases, deem it futile in Congress to require, that States, on entering the Union, shall have anti-slavery Const.i.tutions. The Framers of the Federal Const.i.tution doubtless foresaw the possibility of treachery, on the part of the new States, in the matter of slavery: and the restriction in that instrument to the old States--"the States now existing"--of the right to partic.i.p.ate in the internal and "African slave trade" may be ascribed to the motive of diminis.h.i.+ng, if not indeed of entirely preventing, temptation to such treachery. The Ordinance concerning the North-west Territory, pa.s.sed by the Congress of 1787, and ratified by the Congress of 1790, shows, so far as those bodies can be regarded as correct interpreters of the Const.i.tution which was framed in 1787, and adopted in 1789, that slavery was not to have a const.i.tutional existence in the new States. The Ordinance continues the privilege of recapturing fugitive slaves in the North-west Territory to the "existing States." Slaves in that territory, to be the subjects of lawful recapture, must in the language of the Ordinance, owe "labour or service in one of the _original_ States."

I close what I have to say on this topic, with the remark, that were it admitted, that the reasons for the increase of the number of slave States are sound and satisfactory, it nevertheless would not follow, that the moral and const.i.tutional wrong of preventing that increase is so palpable, as to justify the scorn and insult, which are heaped by Congress upon this hundred thousand pet.i.tioners for this measure.

It has. .h.i.therto been supposed, that you distinctly and fully admitted the Const.i.tutional power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. But, on this point, as on that of the right of pet.i.tion, you have for reasons known to yourself, suddenly and greatly changed your tone. Whilst your speech argues, at no small length, that Congress has not the right to abolish slavery in the District, all that it says in favor of the Const.i.tutional power to abolish it, is that "the language (of the Const.i.tution) may _possibly_ be sufficiently comprehensive to include a power of abolition." "Faint praise dams;" and your very reluctant and qualified concession of the Const.i.tutional power under consideration, is to be construed, rather as a denial than a concession.

Until I acquire the skill of making white whiter, and black blacker, I shall have nothing to say in proof of the Const.i.tutional power of Congress over slavery in the District of Columbia, beyond referring to the terms, in which the Const.i.tution so plainly conveys this power. That instrument authorises Congress "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever over such District." If these words do not confer the power, it is manifest that no words could confer it. I will add that, never, until the last few years, had doubts been expressed, that these words do fully confer that power.

You will, perhaps, say, that Virginia and Maryland made their cessions of the territory, which const.i.tutes the District of Columbia, with reservations on the subject of slavery. We answer, that none were expressed;[A] and that if there had been, Congress would not, and in view of the language of the Const.i.tution, could not, have accepted the cessions. You may then say, that they would not have ceded the territory, had it occurred to them, that Congress would have cleared it of slavery; and that, this being the fact, Congress could not thus clear it, without being guilty of bad faith, and of an ungenerous and unjustifiable surprise on those States. There are several reasons for believing, that those States, not only did not, at the period in question, cherish a dread of the abolition of slavery; but that the public sentiment within them was decidedly in favor of its speedy abolition. At that period, their most distinguished statesmen were trumpet-tongued against slavery. At that period, there was both a Virginia and a Maryland society "for promoting the abolition of slavery;" and, it was then, that, with the entire consent of Virginia and Maryland, effectual measures were adopted to preclude slavery from that large territory, which has since given Ohio and several other States to the Union. On this subject, as on that of the inter-state slave trade, we misinterpret Virginia and Maryland, by not considering, how unlike was their temper in relation to slavery, amidst the decays and dying throes of that inst.i.tution half a century ago, to what it is now, when slavery is not only revivified, but has become the predominant interest and giant power of the nation. We forget, that our whole country was, at that time, smitten with love for the holy cause of impartial and universal liberty. To judge correctly of the view, which our Revolutionary fathers took of oppression, we must go back and stand by their side, in their struggles against it,--we must survey them through the medium of the anti-slavery sentiment of their own times, and not impute to them the pro-slavery spirit so rampant in ours.

[Footnote A: There is a proviso in the Act of Virginia. It was on this, that three years ago, in the Senate of the United States, Benjamin Watkins Leigh built his argument against the const.i.tutional power of Congress to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. I well remember that you then denied the soundness of his argument. This superfluous proviso virtually forbids Congress to pa.s.s laws, which shall "affect the rights of individuals" in the ceded territory. Amongst the inviolable "rights" was that of holding slaves, as Mr. Leigh contended. I regret, that, in replying to him, you did not make use of the fact, that all the members of Congress from Virginia voted in favor of the Ordinance, which abolished slavery in the North-West Territory; and this too, notwithstanding, that, in the Act of 1784, by which she ceded the North-West Territory to the Confederacy, she provided, that the "citizens of Virginia" in the said Territory, many of whom held slaves, should "be protected in the enjoyment of their rights." This fact furnishes striking evidence that at, or about, the time of the cession by Virginia of her portion of the District of Columbia, her statesmen believed, that the right to hold slaves in those portions of our country under the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress, was not beyond the reach of the controlling power of Congress.]

I will, however, suppose it true, that Virginia and Maryland would not have made the cessions in question, had they foreseen, that Congress would abolish slavery in the District of Columbia:--and yet, I affirm, that it would be the duty of Congress to abolish it. Had there been State Prisons in the territory, at the time Congress acquired jurisdiction over it, and had Congress immediately opened their doors, and turned loose hundreds of depraved and b.l.o.o.d.y criminals, there would indeed have been abundant occasion for complaint. But, had the exercise of its power in the premises extended no farther than to the liberation of such convicts, as, on a re-examination of their cases, were found to be clearly guiltless of the crimes charged upon them; the sternest justice could not have objected to such an occasion for the rejoicing of mercy. And are not the thousands in the District, for whose liberation Congress is besought, unjustly deprived of their liberty? Not only are they guiltless, but they are even unaccused of such crimes, as in the judgment of any, justly work a forfeiture of liberty. And what do Virginia and Maryland ask? Is it, that Congress shall resubject to their control those thousands of deeply wronged men? No--for this Congress cannot do. They ask, that Congress shall fulfil the tyrant wishes of these States. They ask, that the whole people of the United States--those who hate, as well as those who love slavery, shall, by their representatives, a.s.sume the guilty and awful responsibility of perpetuating the enslavement of their innocent fellow men:--of chaining the bodies and crus.h.i.+ng the wills, and blotting out the minds of such, as have neither transgressed, nor even been accused of having transgressed, a single human law. And the crime, which Virginia and Maryland, and they, who sympathise with them, would have the nation perpetrate, is, not simply that of prolonging the captivity of those, who were slaves before the cession--for but a handful of them are now remaining in the District. Most of the present number became slaves under the authority of this guilty nation. Their wrongs originated with Congress: and Congress is asked, not only to perpetuate their oppression, but to fasten the yoke of slavery on generations yet unborn.

There are those, who advocate the recession of the District of Columbia.

If the nation were to consent to this, without having previously exercised her power to "break every yoke" of slavery in the District, the blood of those so cruelly left there in "the house of bondage,"

would remain indelible and d.a.m.ning upon her skirts:--and this too, whether Virginia and Maryland did or did not intend to vest Congress with any power over slavery. It is enough, that the nation has the power "to deliver them that are drawn unto death, and those that are ready to be slain," to make her fearfully guilty before G.o.d, if she "forbear" to exercise it.

Suppose, I were to obtain a lease of my neighbor's barn for the single and express purpose of securing my crops; and that I should find, chained up in one of its dark corners, an innocent fellow man, whom that neighbor was subjecting to the process of a lingering death; ought I to pause and recall President Wayland's, "Limitations of Human Responsibility," and finally let the poor sufferer remain in his chains; or ought I not rather, promptly to respond to the laws of my nature and my nature's G.o.d, and let him go free? But, to make this case a.n.a.logous to that we have been considering--to that, which imposes its claims on Congress--we must strike out entirely the condition of the lease, and with it all possible doubts of my right to release the victim of my neighbor's murderous hate.

I am entirely willing to yield, for the sake of argument, that Virginia and Maryland, when ceding the territory which const.i.tutes the District of Columbia, did not antic.i.p.ate, and did not choose the abolition of slavery in it. To make the admission stronger, I will allow, that these States were, at the time of the cession, as warmly opposed to the abolition of slavery in the District as they are said to be now: and to make it stronger still, I will allow, that the abolition of slavery in the District would prove deeply injurious, not only to Virginia and Maryland but to the nation at large. And, after all these admissions, I must still insist, that Congress is under perfectly plain moral obligation to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia.

They, who are deterred from favoring the abolition of slavery in the District by the apprehension, that Virginia and Maryland, if not, indeed, the nation at large, might suffer injurious consequences from the measure, overlook the fact, that there is a third party in the case.