Summa Theologica
Chapter 5 : Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is not altogether simple. For whatever is from G.o.d mu

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d is not altogether simple. For whatever is from G.o.d must imitate Him. Thus from the first being are all beings; and from the first good is all good. But in the things which G.o.d has made, nothing is altogether simple. Therefore neither is G.o.d altogether simple.

Obj. 2: Further, whatever is best must be attributed to G.o.d. But with us that which is composite is better than that which is simple; thus, chemical compounds are better than simple elements, and animals than the parts that compose them. Therefore it cannot be said that G.o.d is altogether simple.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Trin. iv, 6,7): "G.o.d is truly and absolutely simple."

_I answer that,_ The absolute simplicity of G.o.d may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quant.i.tative parts in G.o.d, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His _suppositum_; nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that G.o.d is nowise composite, but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but G.o.d is the first being, as shown above (Q. 2, A. 3). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But G.o.d is uncaused, as shown above (Q. 2, A. 3), since He is the first efficient cause.

Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to G.o.d; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. And this is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. And so, since G.o.d is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "G.o.d, Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim."

Reply Obj. 1: Whatever is from G.o.d imitates Him, as caused things imitate the first cause. But it is of the essence of a thing to be in some sort composite; because at least its existence differs from its essence, as will be shown hereafter, (Q. 4, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 2: With us composite things are better than simple things, because the perfections of created goodness cannot be found in one simple thing, but in many things. But the perfection of divine goodness is found in one simple thing (QQ. 4, A. 1, and 6, A. 2).

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EIGHTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 3, Art. 8]

Whether G.o.d Enters into the Composition of Other Things?

Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d enters into the composition of other things, for Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. iv): "The being of all things is that which is above being--the G.o.dhead." But the being of all things enters into the composition of everything. Therefore G.o.d enters into the composition of other things.

Obj. 2: Further, G.o.d is a form; for Augustine says (De Verb.

Dom. [Serm. x.x.xviii]) that, "the word of G.o.d, which is G.o.d, is an uncreated form." But a form is part of a compound. Therefore G.o.d is part of some compound.

Obj. 3: Further, whatever things exist, in no way differing from each other, are the same. But G.o.d and primary matter exist, and in no way differ from each other. Therefore they are absolutely the same.

But primary matter enters into the composition things. Therefore also does G.o.d. Proof of the minor--whatever things differ, they differ by some differences, and therefore must be composite. But G.o.d and primary matter are altogether simple. Therefore they nowise differ from each other.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. ii): "There can be no touching Him," i.e. G.o.d, "nor any other union with Him by mingling part with part."

Further, the first cause rules all things without commingling with them, as the Philosopher says (De Causis).

_I answer that,_ On this point there have been three errors. Some have affirmed that G.o.d is the world-soul, as is clear from Augustine (De Civ. Dei vii, 6). This is practically the same as the opinion of those who a.s.sert that G.o.d is the soul of the highest heaven. Again, others have said that G.o.d is the formal principle of all things; and this was the theory of the Almaricians. The third error is that of David of Dinant, who most absurdly taught that G.o.d was primary matter. Now all these contain manifest untruth; since it is not possible for G.o.d to enter into the composition of anything, either as a formal or a material principle. First, because G.o.d is the first efficient cause.

Now the efficient cause is not identical numerically with the form of the thing caused, but only specifically: for man begets man. But primary matter can be neither numerically nor specifically identical with an efficient cause; for the former is merely potential, while the latter is actual. Secondly, because, since G.o.d is the first efficient cause, to act belongs to Him primarily and essentially. But that which enters into composition with anything does not act primarily and essentially, but rather the composite so acts; for the hand does not act, but the man by his hand; and, fire warms by its heat. Hence G.o.d cannot be part of a compound. Thirdly, because no part of a compound can be absolutely primal among beings--not even matter, nor form, though they are the primal parts of every compound. For matter is merely potential; and potentiality is absolutely posterior to actuality, as is clear from the foregoing (Q. 3, A. 1): while a form which is part of a compound is a partic.i.p.ated form; and as that which partic.i.p.ates is posterior to that which is essential, so likewise is that which is partic.i.p.ated; as fire in ignited objects is posterior to fire that is essentially such. Now it has been proved that G.o.d is absolutely primal being (Q. 2, A. 3).

Reply Obj. 1: The G.o.dhead is called the being of all things, as their efficient and exemplar cause, but not as being their essence.

Reply Obj. 2: The Word is an exemplar form; but not a form that is part of a compound.

Reply Obj. 3: Simple things do not differ by added differences--for this is the property of compounds. Thus man and horse differ by their differences, rational and irrational; which differences, however, do not differ from each other by other differences. Hence, to be quite accurate, it is better to say that they are, not different, but diverse. Hence, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x), "things which are diverse are absolutely distinct, but things which are different differ by something."

Therefore, strictly speaking, primary matter and G.o.d do not differ, but are by their very being, diverse. Hence it does not follow they are the same.

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QUESTION 4

THE PERFECTION OF G.o.d (In Three Articles)

Having considered the divine simplicity, we treat next of G.o.d's perfection. Now because everything in so far as it is perfect is called good, we shall speak first of the divine perfection; secondly of the divine goodness.

Concerning the first there are three points of inquiry:

(1) Whether G.o.d is perfect?

(2) Whether G.o.d is perfect universally, as having in Himself the perfections of all things?

(3) Whether creatures can be said to be like G.o.d?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 1]

Whether G.o.d is Perfect?

Objection 1: It seems that perfection does not belong to G.o.d. For we say a thing is perfect if it is completely made. But it does not befit G.o.d to be made. Therefore He is not perfect.

Obj. 2: Further, G.o.d is the first beginning of things. But the beginnings of things seem to be imperfect, as seed is the beginning of animal and vegetable life. Therefore G.o.d is imperfect.

Obj. 3: Further, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 4), G.o.d's essence is existence. But existence seems most imperfect, since it is most universal and receptive of all modification. Therefore G.o.d is imperfect.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "Be you perfect as also your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:48).

_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher relates (Metaph. xii), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a material principle is most imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now G.o.d is the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must needs be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the mode of its perfection.

Reply Obj. 1: As Gregory says (Moral. v, 26,29): "Though our lips can only stammer, we yet chant the high things of G.o.d." For that which is not made is improperly called perfect. Nevertheless because created things are then called perfect, when from potentiality they are brought into actuality, this word "perfect" signifies whatever is not wanting in actuality, whether this be by way of perfection or not.

Reply Obj. 2: The material principle which with us is found to be imperfect, cannot be absolutely primal; but must be preceded by something perfect. For seed, though it be the principle of animal life reproduced through seed, has previous to it, the animal or plant from which is came. Because, previous to that which is potential, must be that which is actual; since a potential being can only be reduced into act by some being already actual.

Reply Obj. 3: Existence is the most perfect of all things, for it is compared to all things as that by which they are made actual; for nothing has actuality except so far as it exists. Hence existence is that which actuates all things, even their forms. Therefore it is not compared to other things as the receiver is to the received; but rather as the received to the receiver. When therefore I speak of the existence of man, or horse, or anything else, existence is considered a formal principle, and as something received; and not as that which exists.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 4, Art. 2]

Whether the Perfections of All Things Are in G.o.d?

Objection 1: It seems that the perfections of all things are not in G.o.d. For G.o.d is simple, as shown above (Q. 3, A. 7); whereas the perfections of things are many and diverse. Therefore the perfections of all things are not in G.o.d.

Obj. 2: Further, opposites cannot coexist. Now the perfections of things are opposed to each other, for each thing is perfected by its specific difference. But the differences by which genera are divided, and species const.i.tuted, are opposed to each other.

Therefore because opposites cannot coexist in the same subject, it seems that the perfections of all things are not in G.o.d.

Obj. 3: Further, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists; and an intelligent thing than what merely lives. Therefore life is more perfect than existence; and knowledge than life. But the essence of G.o.d is existence itself. Therefore He has not the perfections of life, and knowledge, and other similar perfections.

_On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that "G.o.d in His one existence prepossesses all things."

_I answer that,_ All created perfections are in G.o.d. Hence He is spoken of as universally perfect, because He lacks not (says the Commentator, _Metaph._ v) any excellence which may be found in any genus. This may be seen from two considerations. First, because whatever perfection exists in an effect must be found in the effective cause: either in the same formality, if it is a univocal agent--as when man reproduces man; or in a more eminent degree, if it is an equivocal agent--thus in the sun is the likeness of whatever is generated by the sun's power. Now it is plain that the effect pre-exists virtually in the efficient cause: and although to pre-exist in the potentiality of a material cause is to pre-exist in a more imperfect way, since matter as such is imperfect, and an agent as such is perfect; still to pre-exist virtually in the efficient cause is to pre-exist not in a more imperfect, but in a more perfect way. Since therefore G.o.d is the first effective cause of things, the perfections of all things must pre-exist in G.o.d in a more eminent way. Dionysius implies the same line of argument by saying of G.o.d (Div. Nom. v): "It is not that He is this and not that, but that He is all, as the cause of all." Secondly, from what has been already proved, G.o.d is existence itself, of itself subsistent (Q. 3, A. 4).

Consequently, He must contain within Himself the whole perfection of being. For it is clear that if some hot thing has not the whole perfection of heat, this is because heat is not partic.i.p.ated in its full perfection; but if this heat were self-subsisting, nothing of the virtue of heat would be wanting to it. Since therefore G.o.d is subsisting being itself, nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him. Now all created perfections are included in the perfection of being; for things are perfect, precisely so far as they have being after some fas.h.i.+on. It follows therefore that the perfection of no one thing is wanting to G.o.d. This line of argument, too, is implied by Dionysius (Div. Nom. v), when he says that, "G.o.d exists not in any single mode, but embraces all being within Himself, absolutely, without limitation, uniformly;" and afterwards he adds that, "He is the very existence to subsisting things."

Reply Obj. 1: Even as the sun (as Dionysius remarks, (Div.

Nom. v)), while remaining one and s.h.i.+ning uniformly, contains within itself first and uniformly the substances of sensible things, and many and diverse qualities; _a fortiori_ should all things in a kind of natural unity pre-exist in the cause of all things; and thus things diverse and in themselves opposed to each other, pre-exist in G.o.d as one, without injury to His simplicity. This suffices for the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply Obj. 3: The same Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v) that, although existence is more perfect than life, and life than wisdom, if they are considered as distinguished in idea; nevertheless, a living thing is more perfect than what merely exists, because living things also exist and intelligent things both exist and live. Although therefore existence does not include life and wisdom, because that which partic.i.p.ates in existence need not partic.i.p.ate in every mode of existence; nevertheless G.o.d's existence includes in itself life and wisdom, because nothing of the perfection of being can be wanting to Him who is subsisting being itself.

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