Summa Theologica
Chapter 7 : THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 3]Whether Every Being Is Good?Objection 1: It seems that no

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 3]

Whether Every Being Is Good?

Objection 1: It seems that not every being is good. For goodness is something superadded to being, as is clear from A. 1. But whatever is added to being limits it; as substance, quant.i.ty, quality, etc.

Therefore goodness limits being. Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 2: Further, no evil is good: "Woe to you that call evil good and good evil" (Isa. 5:20). But some things are called evil. Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 3: Further, goodness implies desirability. Now primary matter does not imply desirability, but rather that which desires.

Therefore primary matter does not contain the formality of goodness.

Therefore not every being is good.

Obj. 4: Further, the Philosopher notes (Metaph. iii) that "in mathematics goodness does not exist." But mathematics are ent.i.ties; otherwise there would be no science of mathematics. Therefore not every being is good.

_On the contrary,_ Every being that is not G.o.d is G.o.d's creature. Now every creature of G.o.d is good (1 Tim. 4:4): and G.o.d is the greatest good. Therefore every being is good.

_I answer that,_ Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in some way perfect; since every act implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness, as is clear from A. 1. Hence it follows that every being as such is good.

Reply Obj. 1: Substance, quant.i.ty, quality, and everything included in them, limit being by applying it to some essence or nature. Now in this sense, goodness does not add anything to being beyond the aspect of desirability and perfection, which is also proper to being, whatever kind of nature it may be. Hence goodness does not limit being.

Reply Obj. 2: No being can be spoken of as evil, formally as being, but only so far as it lacks being. Thus a man is said to be evil, because he lacks some virtue; and an eye is said to be evil, because it lacks the power to see well.

Reply Obj. 3: As primary matter has only potential being, so it is only potentially good. Although, according to the Platonists, primary matter may be said to be a non-being on account of the privation attaching to it, nevertheless, it does partic.i.p.ate to a certain extent in goodness, viz. by its relation to, or apt.i.tude for, goodness. Consequently, to be desirable is not its property, but to desire.

Reply Obj. 4: Mathematical ent.i.ties do not subsist as realities; because they would be in some sort good if they subsisted; but they have only logical existence, inasmuch as they are abstracted from motion and matter; thus they cannot have the aspect of an end, which itself has the aspect of moving another. Nor is it repugnant that there should be in some logical ent.i.ty neither goodness nor form of goodness; since the idea of being is prior to the idea of goodness, as was said in the preceding article.

_______________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 4]

Whether Goodness Has the Aspect of a Final Cause?

Objection 1: It seems that goodness has not the aspect of a final cause, but rather of the other causes. For, as Dionysius says (Div.

Nom. iv), "Goodness is praised as beauty." But beauty has the aspect of a formal cause. Therefore goodness has the aspect of a formal cause.

Obj. 2: Further, goodness is self-diffusive; for Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that goodness is that whereby all things subsist, and are. But to be self-giving implies the aspect of an efficient cause.

Therefore goodness has the aspect of an efficient cause.

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 31) that "we exist because G.o.d is good." But we owe our existence to G.o.d as the efficient cause. Therefore goodness implies the aspect of an efficient cause.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Phys. ii) that "that is to be considered as the end and the good of other things, for the sake of which something is." Therefore goodness has the aspect of a final cause.

_I answer that,_ Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an end, it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see that what is first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g.

heats first of all before it reproduces the form of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing, goodness and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to take place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality of goodness which is the basic principle of its perfection.

Reply Obj. 1: Beauty and goodness in a thing are identical fundamentally; for they are based upon the same thing, namely, the form; and consequently goodness is praised as beauty. But they differ logically, for goodness properly relates to the appet.i.te (goodness being what all things desire); and therefore it has the aspect of an end (the appet.i.te being a kind of movement towards a thing). On the other hand, beauty relates to the cognitive faculty; for beautiful things are those which please when seen. Hence beauty consists in due proportion; for the senses delight in things duly proportioned, as in what is after their own kind--because even sense is a sort of reason, just as is every cognitive faculty. Now since knowledge is by a.s.similation, and similarity relates to form, beauty properly belongs to the nature of a formal cause.

Reply Obj. 2: Goodness is described as self-diffusive in the sense that an end is said to move.

Reply Obj. 3: He who has a will is said to be good, so far as he has a good will; because it is by our will that we employ whatever powers we may have. Hence a man is said to be good, not by his good understanding; but by his good will. Now the will relates to the end as to its proper object. Thus the saying, "we exist because G.o.d is good" has reference to the final cause.

_______________________

FIFTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 5]

Whether the Essence of Goodness Consists in Mode, Species and Order?

Objection 1: It seems that the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order. For goodness and being differ logically. But mode, species and order seem to belong to the nature of being, for it is written: "Thou hast ordered all things in measure, and number, and weight" (Wis. 11:21). And to these three can be reduced species, mode and order, as Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. iv, 3): "Measure fixes the mode of everything, number gives it its species, and weight gives it rest and stability." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.

Obj. 2: Further, mode, species and order are themselves good.

Therefore if the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order, then every mode must have its own mode, species and order. The same would be the case with species and order in endless succession.

Obj. 3: Further, evil is the privation of mode, species and order. But evil is not the total absence of goodness. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.

Obj. 4: Further, that wherein consists the essence of goodness cannot be spoken of as evil. Yet we can speak of an evil mode, species and order. Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.

Obj. 5: Further, mode, species and order are caused by weight, number and measure, as appears from the quotation from Augustine. But not every good thing has weight, number and measure; for Ambrose says (Hexam. i, 9): "It is of the nature of light not to have been created in number, weight and measure." Therefore the essence of goodness does not consist in mode, species and order.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. iii): "These three--mode, species and order--as common good things, are in everything G.o.d has made; thus, where these three abound the things are very good; where they are less, the things are less good; where they do not exist at all, there can be nothing good." But this would not be unless the essence of goodness consisted in them. Therefore the essence of goodness consists in mode, species and order.

_I answer that,_ Everything is said to be good so far as it is perfect; for in that way only is it desirable (as shown above, AA. 1, 3). Now a thing is said to be perfect if it lacks nothing according to the mode of its perfection. But since everything is what it is by its form (and since the form presupposes certain things, and from the form certain things necessarily follow), in order for a thing to be perfect and good it must have a form, together with all that precedes and follows upon that form. Now the form presupposes determination or commensuration of its principles, whether material or efficient, and this is signified by the mode: hence it is said that the measure marks the mode. But the form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher (Metaph. x); for as a unit added to, or taken from a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from a definition, changes its species. Further, upon the form follows an inclination to the end, or to an action, or something of the sort; for everything, in so far as it is in act, acts and tends towards that which is in accordance with its form; and this belongs to weight and order. Hence the essence of goodness, so far as it consists in perfection, consists also in mode, species and order.

Reply Obj. 1: These three only follow upon being, so far as it is perfect, and according to this perfection is it good.

Reply Obj. 2: Mode, species and order are said to be good, and to be beings, not as though they themselves were subsistences, but because it is through them that other things are both beings and good.

Hence they have no need of other things whereby they are good: for they are spoken of as good, not as though formally const.i.tuted so by something else, but as formally const.i.tuting others good: thus whiteness is not said to be a being as though it were by anything else; but because, by it, something else has accidental being, as an object that is white.

Reply Obj. 3: Every being is due to some form. Hence, according to every being of a thing is its mode, species, order. Thus, a man has a mode, species and order as he is white, virtuous, learned and so on; according to everything predicated of him. But evil deprives a thing of some sort of being, as blindness deprives us of that being which is sight; yet it does not destroy every mode, species and order, but only such as follow upon the being of sight.

Reply Obj. 4: Augustine says (De Nat. Boni. xxiii), "Every mode, as mode, is good" (and the same can be said of species and order). "But an evil mode, species and order are so called as being less than they ought to be, or as not belonging to that which they ought to belong. Therefore they are called evil, because they are out of place and incongruous."

Reply Obj. 5: The nature of light is spoken of as being without number, weight and measure, not absolutely, but in comparison with corporeal things, because the power of light extends to all corporeal things; inasmuch as it is an active quality of the first body that causes change, i.e. the heavens.

_______________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 5, Art. 6]

Whether Goodness Is Rightly Divided into the Virtuous*, the Useful and the Pleasant? [*"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good considered as fitting. Cf. II-II, Q. 141, A. 3; Q. 145.]

Objection 1: It seems that goodness is not rightly divided into the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant. For goodness is divided by the ten predicaments, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. i). But the virtuous, the useful and the pleasant can be found under one predicament. Therefore goodness is not rightly divided by them.

Obj. 2: Further, every division is made by opposites. But these three do not seem to be opposites; for the virtuous is pleasing, and no wickedness is useful; whereas this ought to be the case if the division were made by opposites, for then the virtuous and the useful would be opposed; and Tully speaks of this (De Offic. ii). Therefore this division is incorrect.

Obj. 3: Further, where one thing is on account of another, there is only one thing. But the useful is not goodness, except so far as it is pleasing and virtuous. Therefore the useful ought not to divided against the pleasant and the virtuous.

_On the contrary,_ Ambrose makes use of this division of goodness (De Offic. i, 9)

_I answer that,_ This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of goodness from a higher and more universal point of view, we shall find that this division properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term of the movement of the appet.i.te; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration of the movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the end absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the thing itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in the movement of the appet.i.te, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appet.i.te relatively, as a means by which something tends towards another, is called the useful; but that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appet.i.te, as a thing towards which for its own sake the appet.i.te tends, is called the virtuous; for the virtuous is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of the appet.i.te in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called the pleasant.

Reply Obj. 1: Goodness, so far as it is identical with being, is divided by the ten predicaments. But this division belongs to it according to its proper formality.

Reply Obj. 2: This division is not by opposite things; but by opposite aspects. Now those things are called pleasing which have no other formality under which they are desirable except the pleasant, being sometimes hurtful and contrary to virtue. Whereas the useful applies to such as have nothing desirable in themselves, but are desired only as helpful to something further, as the taking of bitter medicine; while the virtuous is predicated of such as are desirable in themselves.