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Summa Theologica Novel Chapters
List of most recent chapters published for the Summa Theologica novel. A total of 816 chapters have been translated and the release date of the last chapter is Apr 02, 2024
Latest Release: Chapter 1 : Summa Theologica.Part I (Prima Pars).by Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Wh
Summa Theologica.Part I (Prima Pars).by Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Whether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is Required?Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For ma
- 401 Objection 1: It would seem that charity is not friends.h.i.+p. For nothing is so appropriate to friends.h.i.+p as to dwell with one's friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards G.o.d and the angels, "who
- 402 Reply Obj. 2: The virtue or art which is concerned about the last end, commands the virtues or arts which are concerned about other ends which are secondary, thus the military art commands the art of horse-riding (Ethic. i). Accordingly since charity has
- 403 _______________________ QUESTION 24 OF THE SUBJECT OF CHARITY (In Twelve Articles) We must now consider charity in relation to its subject, under which head there are twelve points of inquiry: (1) Whether charity is in the will as its subject?(2) Whether
- 404 Reply Obj. 1: The virtue in accordance with which G.o.d gives His gifts to each one, is a disposition or previous preparation or effort of the one who receives grace. But the Holy Ghost forestalls even this disposition or effort, by moving man's mind
- 405 For whosoever says this, leaves the road before coming to his destination." Therefore the wayfarer's charity can ever increase more and more._I answer that,_ A term to the increase of a form may be fixed in three ways: first by reason of the for
- 406 ELEVENTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 24, Art. 11]Whether We Can Lose Charity When Once We Have It?Objection 1: It would seem that we cannot lose charity when once we have it. For if we lose it, this can only be through sin. Now he who has charity cannot sin, for i
- 407 (10) Whether we ought to love the angels out of charity?(11) Whether we ought to love the demons?(12) How to enumerate the things we are bound to love out of charity._______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 1]Whether the Love of Charity S
- 408 Hence, just as unity is the principle of union, so the love with which a man loves himself is the form and root of friends.h.i.+p. For if we have friends.h.i.+p with others it is because we do unto them as we do unto ourselves, hence we read in _Ethic._ i
- 409 EIGHTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 25, Art. 8]Whether Charity Requires That We Should Love Our Enemies?Objection 1: It would seem that charity does not require us to love our enemies. For Augustine says (Enchiridion lxxiii) that "this great good," namely
- 410 Whether Four Things Are Rightly Reckoned As to Be Loved Out of Charity, Viz. G.o.d, Our Neighbor, Our Body and Ourselves?Objection 1: It would seem that these four things are not rightly reckoned as to be loved out of charity, to wit: G.o.d, our neighbor,
- 411 Reply Obj. 1: A thing is a cause of love in two ways: first, as being the reason for loving. In this way good is the cause of love, since each thing is loved according to its measure of goodness. Secondly, a thing causes love, as being a way to acquire lo
- 412 Or we may reply that we have unequal love for certain persons in two ways: first, through our loving some and not loving others. As regards beneficence we are bound to observe this inequality, because we cannot do good to all: but as regards benevolence,
- 413 Obj. 2: Further, where greater love is given, greater love is due.Now a mother loves her child more than the father does: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 7) that "mothers have greater love for their children. For the mother labors more in child-
- 414 Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Which is the more proper to charity, to love or to be loved?(2) Whether to love considered as an act of charity is the same as goodwill?(3) Whether G.o.d should be loved for His own sake?(4) Whet
- 415 59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your G.o.d." Now sin is in the will rather than in the intellect. Therefore man is less able to love G.o.d immediately than to know Him immediately._On the contrary,_ Knowledge of G.o.d, throug
- 416 Obj. 2: Further, in a certain sense it seems to be less meritorious to love one's friend, as stated above (A. 7). Now G.o.d is our chief friend, since "He hath first loved us" (1 John 4:10). Therefore it seems less meritorious to love G.o.d
- 417 _I answer that,_ Fulness of joy can be understood in two ways; first, on the part of the thing rejoiced in, so that one rejoice in it as much as it is meet that one should rejoice in it, and thus G.o.d's joy alone in Himself is filled, because it is
- 418 THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 29, Art. 3]Whether Peace Is the Proper Effect of Charity?Objection 1: It would seem that peace is not the proper effect of charity. For one cannot have charity without sanctifying grace. But some have peace who have not sanctifyin
- 419 Obj. 2: Further, if a defect is the reason for taking pity, those in whom there is most defect, must needs take most pity. But this is false: for the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 8) that "those who are in a desperate state are pitiless." Therefor
- 420 _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 31, Art. 1]Whether Beneficence Is an Act of Charity?Objection 1: It would seem that beneficence is not an act of charity.For charity is chiefly directed to G.o.d. Now we cannot benefit G.o.d, according to J
- 421 QUESTION 32 OF ALMSDEEDS (In Ten Articles) We must now consider almsdeeds, under which head there are ten points of inquiry: (1) Whether almsgiving is an act of charity?(2) Of the different kinds of alms; (3) Which alms are of greater account, spiritual o
- 422 _On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De Serm. Dom. in Monte i, 20) on the words, "Give to him that asketh of thee" (Matt. 5:42): "You should give so as to injure neither yourself nor another, and when you refuse what another asks you must not
- 423 And most of all are the profits from simony ill-gotten, since thereby the Holy Ghost is wronged. Nevertheless out of such gains it is lawful to give alms. Therefore one may give alms out of ill-gotten goods.Obj. 3: Further, greater evils should be avoided
- 424 Nevertheless we must bring discretion to bear on the matter, on account of the various conditions of men, some of whom are more daintily nurtured, and need finer food and clothing. Hence Ambrose says (De Officiis i, 30): "When you give an alms to a m
- 425 Obj. 3: Further, when one man reproves another he moves him by his rebuke to something better. Now in the physical order the inferior is moved by the superior. Therefore in the order of virtue also, which follows the order of nature, it belongs to prelate
- 426 Obj. 3: Further, it is a graver matter to accuse than to denounce.Now one may go to the length of accusing a person publicly, without previously admonis.h.i.+ng him in secret: for it is decided in the Decretal (Cap. Qualiter, xiv, De Accusationibus) that
- 427 Reply Obj. 3: G.o.d draws all things to Himself, in so far as He is the source of being, since all things, in as much as they are, tend to be like G.o.d, Who is Being itself._______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 34, Art. 2]Whether Hatred of G.
- 428 Therefore hatred does not arise from envy.Obj. 2: Further, hatred is opposed to love. Now love of our neighbor is referred to our love of G.o.d, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1; Q. 26, A. 2). Therefore hatred of our neighbor is referred to our hatred of G.o.
- 429 Reply Obj. 2: Sloth is not an aversion of the mind from any spiritual good, but from the Divine good, to which the mind is obliged to adhere. Wherefore if a man is sorry because someone forces him to do acts of virtue that he is not bound to do, this is n
- 430 THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 36, Art. 3]Whether Envy Is a Mortal Sin?Objection 1: It would seem that envy is not a mortal sin. For since envy is a kind of sorrow, it is a pa.s.sion of the sensitive appet.i.te.Now there is no mortal sin in the sensuality, but
- 431 On the contrary stands the authority of Gregory (Moral. x.x.xi, 45)._I answer that,_ Discord denotes a certain disunion of wills, in so far, to wit, as one man's will holds fast to one thing, while the other man's will holds fast to something el
- 432 Obj. 2: Further, a man is apparently a schismatic if he disobeys the Church. But every sin makes a man disobey the commandments of the Church, because sin, according to Ambrose (De Parad. viii) "is disobedience against the heavenly commandments."
- 433 OF WAR (In Four Articles) We must now consider war, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether some kind of war is lawful?(2) Whether it is lawful for clerics to fight?(3) Whether it is lawful for belligerents to lay ambushes?(4) Wheth
- 434 Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything from him.This suffices for the Replies to the O
- 435 OF SEDITION (In Two Articles) We must now consider sedition, under which head there are two points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a special sin?(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 42, Art. 1]Whether Sedition Is a
- 436 _On the contrary,_ Jerome in expounding Matt. 15:12, "Dost thou know that the Pharisees, when they heard this word," etc. says: "When we read 'Whosoever shall scandalize,' the sense is 'Whosoever shall, by deed or word, occas
- 437 Objection 1: It would seem that pa.s.sive scandal may happen even to the perfect. For Christ was supremely perfect: and yet He said to Peter (Matt. 16:23): "Thou art a scandal to Me." Much more therefore can other perfect men suffer scandal.Obj.
- 438 Reply Obj. 5: The scandal which the Apostle avoided, arose from an error of the gentiles who were not used to this payment. Hence it behooved him to forego it for the time being, so that they might be taught first of all that such a payment was a duty. Fo
- 439 Obj. 2: Further, "A thing is whole and perfect when it lacks nothing"(Phys. iii, 6). If therefore it is a matter of precept that G.o.d be loved with the whole heart, whoever does something not pertaining to the love of G.o.d, acts counter to the
- 440 _I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 4, ad 1), the mode which is essential to an act of virtue comes under the precept which prescribes that virtuous act. Now the order of charity is essential to the virtue, since it is based on the proportion of love to
- 441 Reply Obj. 3: A thing is considered in itself before being compared with something else. Wherefore to wisdom belongs first of all contemplation which is the vision of the Beginning, and afterwards the direction of human acts according to the Divine rules.
- 442 Obj. 4: Further, Isidore says (Etym. x, under the letter S) that "a fool is one whom shame does not incite to sorrow, and who is unconcerned when he is injured." But this pertains to spiritual wisdom, according to Gregory (Moral. x, 49). Therefo
- 443 (15) Whether prudence is in us naturally?(16) Whether prudence is lost by forgetfulness?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 47, Art. 1]Whether Prudence Is in the Cognitive or in the Appet.i.tive Faculty?Objection 1: It would seem that prudenc
- 444 Whether Prudence Is a Special Virtue?Objection 1: It would seem that prudence is not a special virtue. For no special virtue is included in the definition of virtue in general, since virtue is defined (Ethic. ii, 6) "an elective habit that follows a
- 445 Obj. 3: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 3) the "magnanimous man is slow and leisurely." Now slowness is contrary to solicitude.Since then prudence is not opposed to magnanimity, for "good is not opposed to good," as stated in
- 446 _I answer that,_ Prudence is threefold. There is a false prudence, which takes its name from its likeness to true prudence. For since a prudent man is one who disposes well of the things that have to be done for a good end, whoever disposes well of such t
- 447 (1) Which are the parts of prudence?(2) Of its integral parts; (3) Of its subjective parts; (4) Of its potential parts._______________________ ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 48, Art.]Whether Three Parts of Prudence Are Fittingly a.s.signed?Objection 1: It would seem
- 448 Whether Understanding* Is a Part of Prudence?[*Otherwise intuition; Aristotle's word is _nous_]Objection 1: It would seem that understanding is not a part of prudence. When two things are members of a division, one is not part of the other. But intel
- 449 Obj. 2: Further, prudence is only practical, whereas foresight may be also speculative, because _seeing,_ whence we have the word "to foresee," has more to do with speculation than operation. Therefore foresight is not a part of prudence.Obj. 3:
- 450 Whether Political Prudence Is Fittingly Accounted a Part of Prudence?Objection 1: It would seem that political prudence is not fittingly accounted a part of prudence. For regnative is a part of political prudence, as stated above (A. 1). But a part should
- 451 Reply Obj. 2: Although virtue is essentially a perfection, it does not follow that whatever is the matter of a virtue implies perfection. For man needs to be perfected by virtues in all his parts, and this not only as regards the acts of reason, of which
- 452 Whether Counsel Should Be Reckoned Among the Gifts of the Holy Ghost?Objection 1: It would seem that counsel should not be reckoned among the gifts of the Holy Ghost. The gifts of the Holy Ghost are given as a help to the virtues, according to Gregory (Mo
- 453 Accordingly we must consider first of all those vices which are in evident opposition to prudence, those namely which are due to a defect either of prudence or of those things which are requisite for prudence, and secondly those vices which have a false r
- 454 Obj. 3: Further, prudence consists in acts of the practical reason, viz. _counsel,_ _judgment_ about what has been counselled, and _command_ [*Cf. Q. 47, A. 8]. Now thought precedes all these acts, since it belongs also to the speculative intellect. There
- 455 Obj. 2: Further, every sin of omission seems to be due to negligence.But sins of omission are not opposed to prudence, but to the executive moral virtues. Therefore negligence is not opposed to prudence.Obj. 3: Further, imprudence relates to some act of r
- 456 Therefore prudence of the flesh is a mortal sin.Obj. 2: Further, every sin against the Holy Ghost is a mortal sin.Now prudence of the flesh seems to be a sin against the Holy Ghost, for "it cannot be subject to the law of G.o.d" (Rom. 8:7), and
- 457 _On the contrary,_ Our Lord said (Matt. 6:31): "Be not solicitous ... saying, What shall we eat, or what shall we drink, or wherewith shall we be clothed?" And yet such things are very necessary._I answer that,_ Solicitude denotes an earnest end
- 458 Obj. 2: Further, there is room for fraud in other things than in buying and selling. Therefore the Law unfittingly forbade fraud solely in buying and selling.Obj. 3: Further, there is the same reason for prescribing an act of virtue as for prohibiting the
- 459 Obj. 3: Further, right as stated above (A. 2) is divided into natural and positive. Now the right of nations is not a positive right, since all nations never agreed to decree anything by common agreement.Therefore the right of nations is a natural right._
- 460 Reply Obj. 5: A judge renders to each one what belongs to him, by way of command and direction, because a judge is the "personification of justice," and "the sovereign is its guardian" (Ethic. v, 4). On the other hand, the subjects ren
- 461 Reply Obj. 1: Justice is specified or enumerated with the other virtues, not as a general but as a special virtue, as we shall state further on (AA. 7, 12).Reply Obj. 2: Temperance and fort.i.tude are in the sensitive appet.i.te, viz. in the concupiscible
- 462 Reply Obj. 3: The common good is the end of each individual member of a community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part. On the other hand the good of one individual is not the end of another individual: wherefore legal justice which is d
- 463 _I answer that,_ Injustice is twofold. First there is illegal injustice which is opposed to legal justice: and this is essentially a special vice, in so far as it regards a special object, namely the common good which it contemns; and yet it is a general
- 464 FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 1]Whether Judgment Is an Act of Justice?Objection 1: It would seem that judgment is not an act of justice.The Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 3) that "everyone judges well of what he knows," so that judgment would s
- 465 FIFTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 60, Art. 5]Whether We Should Always Judge According to the Written Law?Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not always to judge according to the written law. For we ought always to avoid judging unjustly. But written laws some
- 466 Reply Obj. 5: Distributive and commutative justice differ not only in respect of unity and mult.i.tude, but also in respect of different kinds of due: because common property is due to an individual in one way, and his personal property in another way.___
- 467 Whether Rest.i.tution Is an Act of Commutative Justice?Objection 1: It would seem that rest.i.tution is not an act of commutative justice. For justice regards the notion of what is due.Now one may restore, even as one may give, that which is not due.There
- 468 Whether Rest.i.tution Must Always Be Made to the Person from Whom a Thing Has Been Taken?Objection 1: It would seem that rest.i.tution need not always be made to the person from whom a thing has been taken. For it is not lawful to injure anyone. Now it wo
- 469 21:2, "Flee from sin as from the face of a serpent." Consequently one is bound to immediate rest.i.tution, if possible, or to ask for a respite from the person who is empowered to grant the use of the thing.Reply Obj. 1: Although the precept abo
- 470 Hence the Replies to the Objections are clear._______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 63, Art. 4]Whether the Sin of Respect of Persons Takes Place in Judicial Sentences?Objection 1: It would seem that the sin of respect of persons does not take
- 471 _______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 64, Art. 3]Whether It Is Lawful for a Private Individual to Kill a Man Who Has Sinned?Objection 1: It would seem lawful for a private individual to kill a man who has sinned. For nothing unlawful is command
- 472 Reply Obj. 2: In weighing the gravity of a sin we must consider the essential rather than the accidental. Wherefore he who kills a just man, sins more grievously than he who slays a sinful man: first, because he injures one whom he should love more, and s
- 473 _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 65, Art. 2]Whether It Is Lawful for Parents to Strike Their Children, or Masters Their Slaves?Objection 1: It would seem unlawful for parents to strike their children, or masters their slaves. For the Apos
- 474 Whether It Is Natural for Man to Possess External Things?Objection 1: It would seem that it is not natural for man to possess external things. For no man should ascribe to himself that which is G.o.d's. Now the dominion over all creatures is proper t
- 475 Objection 1: It would seem that theft is not always a sin. For no sin is commanded by G.o.d, since it is written (Ecclus. 15:21): "He hath commanded no man to do wickedly." Yet we find that G.o.d commanded theft, for it is written (Ex. 12:35, 36
- 476 Objection 1: It would seem that theft is a more grievous sin than robbery. For theft adds fraud and guile to the taking of another's property: and these things are not found in robbery. Now fraud and guile are sinful in themselves, as stated above (Q
- 477 _I answer that,_ A judge is an interpreter of justice. Wherefore, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. v, 4), "men have recourse to a judge as to one who is the personification of justice." Now, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 2), justice is not between a
- 478 THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 68, Art. 3]Whether an Accusation Is Rendered Unjust by Calumny, Collusion or Evasion?Objection 1: It would seem that an accusation is not rendered unjust by calumny, collusion or evasion. For according to Decret. II, qu.iii [*Appe
- 479 _I answer that,_ It is one thing to withhold the truth, and another to utter a falsehood. The former is lawful sometimes, for a man is not bound to divulge all truth, but only such as the judge can and must require of him according to the order of justice
- 480 _______________________ SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 70, Art. 2]Whether the Evidence of Two or Three Persons Suffices?Objection 1: It would seem that the evidence of two or three persons is not sufficient. For judgment requires cert.i.tude. Now cert.i.tude o
- 481 Obj. 3: Further, the precept about performing works of mercy, being affirmative, is binding according to time and place, and this is chiefly in cases of need. Now it seems to be a case of need when the suit of a poor man is being prejudiced. Therefore it
- 482 FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 72, Art. 1]Whether Reviling Consists in Words?Objection 1: It would seem that reviling does not consist in words.Reviling implies some injury inflicted on one's neighbor, since it is a kind of injustice. But words seem to inf
- 483 QUESTION 73 OF BACKBITING [*Or detraction](In Four Articles) We must now consider backbiting, under which head there are four points of inquiry: (1) What is backbiting?(2) Whether it is a mortal sin?(3) Of its comparison with other sins; (4) Whether it is
- 484 FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 73, Art. 4]Whether It Is a Grave Sin for the Listener to Suffer the Backbiter?Objection 1: It would seem that the listener who suffers a backbiter does not sin grievously. For a man is not under greater obligations to others than
- 485 Objection 1: It would seem that derision is not a special sin distinct from those mentioned above. For laughing to scorn is apparently the same as derision. But laughing to scorn pertains to reviling. Therefore derision would seem not to differ from revil
- 486 Obj. 2: Further, in an irrational creature there is nothing but the nature which G.o.d made. But it is unlawful to curse this even in the devil, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore it is nowise lawful to curse an irrational creature.Obj. 3: Further, irratio
- 487 On the other hand if a man find that he derives great advantage from something he has bought, he may, of his own accord, pay the seller something over and above: and this pertains to his honesty.Reply Obj. 1: As stated above (I-II, Q. 96, A. 2) human law
- 488 We must now consider the sin of usury, which is committed in loans: and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether it is a sin to take money as a price for money lent, which is to receive usury?(2) Whether it is lawful to lend money for
- 489 Reply Obj. 7: If a man wish to sell his goods at a higher price than that which is just, so that he may wait for the buyer to pay, it is manifestly a case of usury: because this waiting for the payment of the price has the character of a loan, so that wha
- 490 Obj. 2: Further, no species is more comprehensive than its genus. But transgression is more comprehensive than sin, because sin is a "word, deed or desire against the law of G.o.d," according to Augustine (Contra Faust. xxii, 27), while transgre
- 491 Obj. 5: Further, Aristotle (Ethic. v, 10) mentions _epieikeia_ as being annexed to justice: and yet seemingly it is not included in any of the foregoing enumerations. Therefore the virtues annexed to justice are insufficiently enumerated._I answer that,_
- 492 _I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, A. 3; I-II, Q. 55, AA. 3, 4) "a virtue is that which makes its possessor good, and his act good likewise," wherefore we must needs say that every good act belongs to a virtue. Now it is evident that to re
- 493 Reply Obj. 2: In offering a thing to a man on account of its usefulness to him, the more needy the man the more praiseworthy the offering, because it is more useful: whereas we offer a thing to G.o.d not on account of its usefulness to Him, but for the sa
- 494 Objection 1: It would seem that devotion is not an act of religion.Devotion, as stated above (A. 1), consists in giving oneself up to G.o.d. But this is done chiefly by charity, since according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv) "the Divine love produces ec
- 495 (15) Whether prayer is meritorious? [*Art. 16](16) Whether sinners impetrate anything from G.o.d by praying? [*Art.15](17) of the different kinds of prayer._______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 83, Art. 1]Whether Prayer Is an Act of the Appet.i
- 496 Reply Obj. 2: The dead, if we consider their natural condition, do not know what takes place in this world, especially the interior movements of the heart. Nevertheless, according to Gregory (Moral.xii, 21), whatever it is fitting the blessed should know
- 497 Therefore we should not pray for our enemies._On the contrary,_ It is written (Matt. 5:44): "Pray for them that persecute and calumniate you."_I answer that,_ To pray for another is an act of charity, as stated above (A. 7). Wherefore we are bou
- 498 Wherefore it is said of Christ (Heb. 7:25): "Going to G.o.d by His own power ... to make intercession for us" [*Vulg.: 'He is able to save for ever them that come to G.o.d by Him, always living to make intercession for us.']. Hence Jer
- 499 Objection 1: It would seem that prayer is not meritorious. All merit proceeds from grace. But prayer precedes grace, since even grace is obtained by means of prayer according to Luke 11:13, "(How much more) will your Father from heaven give the good
- 500 Reply Obj. 1: Reverence is due to G.o.d on account of His excellence, which is communicated to certain creatures not in equal measure, but according to a measure of proportion; and so the reverence which we pay to G.o.d, and which belongs to latria, diffe