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Summa Theologica Novel Chapters
List of most recent chapters published for the Summa Theologica novel. A total of 816 chapters have been translated and the release date of the last chapter is Apr 02, 2024
Latest Release: Chapter 1 : Summa Theologica.Part I (Prima Pars).by Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Wh
Summa Theologica.Part I (Prima Pars).by Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Whether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is Required?Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For ma
- 201 Reply Obj. 3: In speaking "of ignorance of choice," we do not mean that choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of what ought to be chosen.________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 2]Whether Choice Is to Be Fo
- 202 SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 6]Whether Man Chooses of Necessity or Freely?Objection 1: It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of that which follows from the principles, as
- 203 _I answer that,_ Counsel properly implies a conference held between several; the very word (_consilium_) denotes this, for it means a sitting together (_considium_), from the fact that many sit together in order to confer with one another. Now we must tak
- 204 Whether Consent Is an Act of the Appet.i.tive or of the Apprehensive Power?Objection 1: It would seem that consent belongs only to the apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) ascribes consent to the higher reason. But the reason is
- 205 (2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?(3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?(4) Of the relation of use to choice.________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 1]Whether Use Is an Act of the Will?Objection 1: It w
- 206 QUESTION 17 OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (In Nine Articles) We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?(2) Whether command belongs
- 207 Whether Command and the Commanded Act Are One Act, or Distinct?Objection 1: It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and
- 208 EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 8]Whether the Act of the Vegetal Soul Is Commanded?Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are subject to the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of higher rank than the vegetal powers. Bu
- 209 Reply Obj. 3: An evil action can have a proper effect, according to the goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason._____
- 210 ________________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 6]Whether an Action Has the Species of Good or Evil from Its End?Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive
- 211 ________________________ TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 10]Whether a Circ.u.mstance Places a Moral Action in the Species of Good or Evil?Objection 1: It would seem that a circ.u.mstance cannot place a moral action in the species of good or evil. For the
- 212 Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relations.h.i.+p to the will than to any other power. But the acts of the o
- 213 Obj. 3: Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides by erring reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction with erring reason: so that in such a case a man w
- 214 Objection 1: It would seem that the human will need not always be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we cannot will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object of the will. But in many things we know not what G.o
- 215 Reply Obj. 1: If the good tree be taken to signify the good will, it must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act willed and from the end intended.Reply Obj. 2: A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end; but also when he wi
- 216 _On the contrary,_ The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be both good and evil._On the contrary,_ The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries. But good and evil are co
- 217 Reply Obj. 3: This very good or evil, which a man does to himself by his action, redounds to the community, as stated above.________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 21, Art. 4]Whether a Human Action Is Meritorious or Demeritorious Before G.o.d, A
- 218 ii) Hierotheus "to be taught by a kind of yet more G.o.dlike instruction; not only by learning Divine things, but also by suffering (_patiens_) them." But the sensitive appet.i.te cannot "suffer"Divine things, since its object is the s
- 219 In like manner neither can there be according to contrariety of good and evil. Because the opposite of present evil is good obtained, which can be no longer have the aspect of arduousness or difficulty.Nor, when once good is obtained, does there remain an
- 220 THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 3]Whether Pa.s.sion Increases or Decreases the Goodness or Malice of an Act?Objection 1: It would seem that every pa.s.sion decreases the goodness of a moral action. For anything that hinders the judgment of reason, on whi
- 221 Obj. 3: Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure (Ethic. viii, 3, 4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible pa.s.sio
- 222 Now in each of these appet.i.tes, the name "love" is given to the principle of movement towards the end loved. In the natural appet.i.te the principle of this movement is the appet.i.tive subject's connaturalness with the thing to which it
- 223 (4) Whether any other pa.s.sion of the soul is a cause of love?________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 27, Art. 1]Whether Good Is the Only Cause of Love?Objection 1: It would seem that good is not the only cause of love.For good does not cause lo
- 224 Reply Obj. 1: When a man loves a thing for the pleasure it affords, his love is indeed caused by pleasure; but that very pleasure is caused, in its turn, by another preceding love; for none takes pleasure save in that which is loved in some way.Reply Obj.
- 225 Reply Obj. 1: This argument is true of the first kind of ecstasy.Reply Obj. 2: This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply.Reply Obj. 3: He who loves, goes out from himself, in so far as he wills t
- 226 FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 1]Whether Evil Is the Cause and Object of Hatred?Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not the object and cause of hatred. For everything that exists, as such, is good. If therefore evil be the object of hatred, it follo
- 227 ________________________ FIFTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 29, Art. 5]Whether a Man Can Hate the Truth?Objection 1: It would seem that a man cannot hate the truth. For good, true, and being are convertible. But a man cannot hate good.Neither, therefore, can he hate
- 228 Therefore concupiscence is not a specific pa.s.sion in the concupiscible faculty.Obj. 3: Further, to each pa.s.sion of the concupiscible faculty there is a specific contrary pa.s.sion in that faculty, as stated above (Q.23, A. 4). But no specific pa.s.sio
- 229 Whether Delight Is a Pa.s.sion?Objection 1: It would seem that delight is not a pa.s.sion. For Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes operation from pa.s.sion, and says that "operation is a movement in accord with nature, while pa.s.sion is a
- 230 Whether Bodily and Sensible Pleasures Are Greater Than Spiritual and Intellectual Pleasures?Objection 1: It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek some pleasure, according to t
- 231 We must now consider the causes of pleasure: and under this head there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whether operation is the proper cause of pleasure?(2) Whether movement is a cause of pleasure?(3) Whether hope and memory cause pleasure?(4) Whether sa
- 232 Obj. 3: Further, as sadness is to pleasure, so is hatred to love. But hatred does not cause love, but rather the other way about, as stated above (Q. 29, A. 2). Therefore sadness does not cause pleasure._On the contrary,_ It is written (Ps. 41:4): "M
- 233 This again is why "it is more delightful to be delivered from great danger, because it is something wonderful," as stated in _Rhetor._ i, 11.Reply Obj. 1: Wonder gives pleasure, not because it implies ignorance, but in so far as it includes the
- 234 FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 33, Art. 4]Whether Pleasure Perfects Operation?Objection 1: It would seem that pleasure does not perfect operation.For every human operation depends on the use of reason. But pleasure hinders the use of reason, as stated above (A.
- 235 Obj. 3: Further, that which is the greatest good is universally good, as being good of itself: since that which is such of itself is prior to and greater than that which is such accidentally. But pleasure is not universally good, as stated above (A. 2). T
- 236 Whether Sorrow Is the Same As Pain?Objection 1: It would seem that sorrow is not pain. For Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "pain is used to express bodily suffering."But sorrow is used more in reference to the soul. Therefore sorrow is
- 237 Reply Obj. 2: Things which are contrary according to nature are not contrary according as they exist in the mind: for things that are contrary in reality are not contrary in the order of thought; indeed rather is one contrary the reason for knowing the ot
- 238 (2) Whether desire is a cause of sorrow?(3) Whether the craving for unity is a cause of sorrow?(4) Whether an irresistible power is a cause of sorrow?________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 36, Art. 1]Whether Sorrow Is Caused by the Loss of Good
- 239 Reply Obj. 1: A greater power causes sorrow, as acting not potentially but actually, i.e. by causing the actual presence of the corruptive evil.Reply Obj. 2: Nothing hinders a power which is not simply greater, from being greater in some respect: and acco
- 240 Obj. 2: Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to its having a bodily trans.m.u.tation in conjunction with it. But bodily trans.m.u.tation takes place in all the pa.s.sions of the soul, as stated above (Q. 22, AA. 1, 3). Therefore sorr
- 241 _On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them._I answer that,_ When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation: whereof th
- 242 Therefore sorrow is not a virtuous good.Obj. 2: Further, the virtuous good is praiseworthy and meritorious.But sorrow lessens praise or merit: for the Apostle says (2 Cor.9:7): "Everyone, as he hath determined in his heart, not with sadness, or of ne
- 243 Obj. 2: Further, pa.s.sions differ according to their objects. But the object of hope is the same as the object of cupidity or desire, viz.the future good. Therefore hope is the same as cupidity or desire.Obj. 3: If it be said that hope, in addition to de
- 244 _On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8) "some are hopeful, through having been victorious often and over many opponents": which seems to pertain to experience. Therefore experience is a cause of hope._I answer that,_ As stated ab
- 245 Whether Fear Is a Pa.s.sion of the Soul?Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a pa.s.sion of the soul.For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by way of _systole_"--i.e. of contraction--"desirous of vindicatin
- 246 Reply Obj. 3: The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of fear.Reply Obj. 4: Not every amazement and stupor are species of fear, but that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and
- 247 But since the human will may be inclined to sin by an extrinsic cause; if this cause have a strong power of inclination, in that respect a man may fear the evil of sin, in so far as it arises from that extrinsic cause: as when he fears to dwell in the com
- 248 Obj. 3: Further, it has been stated above (Q. 42, A. 3) that those things which occur by our own doing are not fearful. But that which we do from love, is done from our inmost heart. Therefore fear is not caused by love._On the contrary,_ Augustine says (
- 249 Secondly, a man of counsel means one who is apt for giving good counsel: and in this sense, neither fear nor any pa.s.sion makes men of counsel. Because when a man is affected by a pa.s.sion, things seem to him greater or smaller than they really are: thu
- 250 Obj. 2: Further, just as daring is contrary to fear, so is despair contrary to hope. But fear does not ensue from despair: in fact, despair excludes fear, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5).Therefore daring does not result from hope.Obj. 3: Further, da
- 251 Objection 1: It would seem that anger is not a special pa.s.sion. For the irascible power takes its name from anger (_ira_). But there are several pa.s.sions in this power, not only one. Therefore anger is not one special pa.s.sion.Obj. 2: Further, to eve
- 252 Obj. 3: Further, anger is a craving for vengeance: while desire is a craving for those things especially which are pleasant to the touch, viz. for pleasures of the table and for s.e.xual pleasures. But these things are more natural to man than vengeance.
- 253 (1) Whether the motive of anger is always something done against the one who is angry?(2) Whether slight or contempt is the sole motive of anger?(3) Of the cause of anger on the part of the angry person; (4) Of the cause of anger on the part of the person
- 254 _On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that "the rich man is angry with the poor man, if the latter despise him; and in like manner the prince is angry with his subject."_I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3) unmerited contem
- 255 Reply Obj. 2: An angry man is said to be open, not because it is clear to him what he ought to do, but because he acts openly, without thought of hiding himself. This is due partly to the reason being hindered, so as not to discern what should be hidden a
- 256 But the mode o[r] determination of the subject, in regard to action or pa.s.sion, is considered in the second and third species of quality.And therefore in both, we take into account whether a thing be done with ease or difficulty; whether it be transitor
- 257 Obj. 2: Further, all bodily dispositions are easy to change. But habit is a quality, difficult to change. Therefore no bodily disposition can be a habit.Obj. 3: Further, all bodily dispositions are subject to change. But change can only be in the third sp
- 258 Reply Obj. 1: Some said, as Simplicius reports in his _Commentary on the Predicaments,_ that, since every operation of man is to a certain extent an operation of the _conjunctum,_ as the Philosopher says (De Anima i, text. 64); therefore no habit is in th
- 259 But the habit which is a disposition to operation, and whose subject is a power of the soul, as stated above (Q. 50, A. 2), may be natural whether in respect of the specific nature or in respect of the individual nature: in respect of the specific nature,
- 260 (2) Whether they increase by addition?(3) Whether each act increases the habit?________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 52, Art. 1]Whether Habits Increase?Objection 1: It would seem that habits cannot increase. For increase concerns quant.i.ty (Ph
- 261 ________________________ QUESTION 53 HOW HABITS ARE CORRUPTED OR DIMINISHED (In Three Articles) We must now consider how habits are lost or weakened; and under this head there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether a habit can be corrupted?(2) Whether i
- 262 OF THE DISTINCTION OF HABITS (In Four Articles) We have now to consider the distinction of habits; and under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether many habits can be in one power?(2) Whether habits are distinguished by their objects?(3)
- 263 But nothing simple is made up of many. Therefore one habit is not made up of many._I answer that,_ A habit directed to operation, such as we are chiefly concerned with at present, is a perfection of a power. Now every perfection should be in proportion wi
- 264 Obj. 2: Further, Virtue corresponds to power. But power is not only referred to good, but also to evil: according to Isa. 5: "Woe to you that are mighty to drink wine, and stout men at drunkenness."Therefore virtue also is referred to good and e
- 265 ________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 56, Art. 2]Whether One Virtue Can Be in Several Powers?Objection 1: It would seem that one virtue can be in several powers.For habits are known by their acts. But one act proceeds in various way from sever
- 266 Nevertheless even if there be habits in such powers, they cannot be virtues. For virtue is a perfect habit, by which it never happens that anything but good is done: and so virtue must needs be in that power which consummates the good act. But the knowled
- 267 Reply Obj. 1: Wisdom is a kind of science, in so far as it has that which is common to all the sciences; viz. to demonstrate conclusions from principles. But since it has something proper to itself above the other sciences, inasmuch as it judges of them a
- 268 Obj. 4: Further, Cicero (De Invent. Rhet. iii) mentions three other parts of prudence; viz. "memory of the past, understanding of the present, and foresight of the future." Moreover, Macrobius (Super Somn. Scip. 1) mentions yet others: viz. &quo
- 269 Obj. 2: Further, continency, perseverance, and patience are not reckoned to be intellectual virtues. Yet neither are they moral virtues; since they do not reduce the pa.s.sions to a mean, and are consistent with an abundance of pa.s.sion. Therefore virtue
- 270 Reply Obj. 2: If by vice we understand a habit of doing evil deeds, it is evident that no pa.s.sion is a vice. But if vice is taken to mean sin which is a vicious act, nothing hinders a pa.s.sion from being a vice, or, on the other hand, from concurring i
- 271 _On the contrary,_ "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8. But joy is a pa.s.sion. Therefore justice cannot be without pa.s.sion; and still less can the other virtues be._I answer that,_ If we take the pa.s.si
- 272 FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 4]Whether There Are Different Moral Virtues About Different Pa.s.sions?Objection 1: It would seem that there are not different moral virtues about different pa.s.sions. For there is but one habit about things that concur
- 273 Reply Obj. 2: The theological virtues are above man, as stated above (Q. 58, A. 3, ad 3). Hence they should properly be called not human, but "super-human" or G.o.dlike virtues.Reply Obj. 3: Although the intellectual virtues, except in prudence,
- 274 Again, since man by his nature is a social [*See above note on Chrysostom] animal, these virtues, in so far as they are in him according to the condition of his nature, are called "social"virtues; since it is by reason of them that man behaves h
- 275 ________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 62, Art. 4]Whether Faith Precedes Hope, and Hope Charity?Objection 1: It would seem that the order of the theological virtues is not that faith precedes hope, and hope charity. For the root precedes that w
- 276 Objection 1: It would seem that no virtues besides the theological virtues are infused in us by G.o.d. Because G.o.d does not do by Himself, save perhaps sometimes miraculously, those things that can be done by second causes; for, as Dionysius says (Coel.
- 277 First, according as the mean is observed in the act itself of reason, as though the very act of reason were made to observe the mean: in this sense, since moral virtue perfects not the act of reason, but the act of the appet.i.tive power, the mean of mora
- 278 Reply Obj. 1: Some moral virtues perfect man as regards his general state, in other words, with regard to those things which have to be done in every kind of human life. Hence man needs to exercise himself at the same time in the matters of all moral virt
- 279 _On the contrary,_ The Apostle says (Heb. 11:6): "Without faith it is impossible to please G.o.d"; and this evidently belongs most to charity, according to Prov. 8:17: "I love them that love me." Again, it is by hope that we are brough
- 280 Therefore intellectual virtue is better than moral virtue._I answer that,_ A thing may be said to be greater or less in two ways: first, simply; secondly, relatively. For nothing hinders something from being better simply, e.g. "learning than riches,
- 281 (2) Whether the intellectual virtues remain?(3) Whether faith remains?(4) Whether hope remains?(5) Whether anything remains of faith or hope?(6) Whether charity remains?________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 67, Art. 1]Whether the Moral Virtues
- 282 Reply Obj. 2: Faith is the foundation in as much as it is knowledge: consequently when this knowledge is perfected, the foundation will be perfected also.The Reply to the Third Objection is clear from what has been said.________________________ FOURTH ART
- 283 ________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 68, Art. 1]Whether the Gifts Differ from the Virtues?Objection 1: It would seem that the gifts do not differ from the virtues. For Gregory commenting on Job 1:2, "There were born to him seven sons,&quo
- 284 Whether the Seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost Are Suitably Enumerated?Objection 1: It would seem that seven gifts of the Holy Ghost are unsuitably enumerated. For in that enumeration four are set down corresponding to the intellectual virtues, viz. wisdom, un
- 285 Reply Obj. 1: Fear is chiefly required as being the foundation, so to speak, of the perfection of the other gifts, for "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom" (Ps. 110:10; Ecclus. 1:16), and not as though it were more excellent than th
- 286 Reply Obj. 1: Hope regards future happiness as the last end: yet it may also regard the a.s.sistance of grace as that which leads to that end, according to Ps. 27:7: "In Him hath my heart hoped, and I have been helped."Reply Obj. 2: Although som
- 287 Objection 1: It would seem that the fruits of the Holy Ghost, enumerated by the Apostle (Gal. 5:22, 23), are not acts. For that which bears fruit, should not itself be called a fruit, else we should go on indefinitely. But our actions bear fruit: for it i
- 288 Reply Obj. 2: "Good happens in one way, evil in all manner of ways,"as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): so that to one virtue many vices are contrary. Consequently we must not be surprised if the works of the flesh are more numerous than the fruit
- 289 Reply Obj. 1: Nothing hinders one thing from standing above another simply, and below it in some respect. Now a thing is deemed above another simply if it surpa.s.ses it in a point which is proper to both; while it is deemed above it in a certain respect,
- 290 We must now consider the distinction of sins or vices: under which head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether sins are distinguished specifically by their objects?(2) Of the distinction between spiritual and carnal sins; (3) Whether sins differ in
- 291 Whether Sin Is Fittingly Divided into Sin Against G.o.d, Against Oneself, and Against One's Neighbor?Objection 1: It would seem that sin is unfittingly divided into sin against G.o.d, against one's neighbor, and against oneself. For that which i
- 292 Obj. 2: Further, just as sin, in matters of action, is due to straying from the rect.i.tude of reason, so falsehood, in speculative matters, is due to straying from the truth of the reality. Now the species of falsehood is not diversified by saying more o
- 293 SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 73, Art. 2]Whether All Sins Are Equal?Objection 1: It would seem that all sins are equal. Because sin is to do what is unlawful. Now to do what is unlawful is reproved in one and the same way in all things. Therefore sin is reprov
- 294 Now the greater the defect in the reason, the less grievous the sin: so much so that he who lacks the use of reason, is altogether excused from sin, and he who sins through ignorance, sins less grievously.Therefore the gravity of a sin is not increased by
- 295 Obj. 3: Further, no one should reap disadvantage from good. But he would, if his action were the more blameworthy on account of his goodness. Therefore a sin is not aggravated by reason of the excellence of the person sinning._On the contrary,_ Isidore sa
- 296 _I answer that,_ As stated above (AA. 2, 3), sin may be found in any power whose act can be voluntary and inordinate, wherein consists the nature of sin. Now it is evident that the act of the sensuality, or sensitive appet.i.te, is naturally inclined to b
- 297 Reply Obj. 1: Consent is an act of the appet.i.tive power, not absolutely, but in consequence of an act of reason deliberating and judging, as stated above (Q. 15, A. 3). Because the fact that the consent is finally given to a thing is due to the fact tha
- 298 We must now consider the causes of sin: (1) in general; (2) in particular. Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether sin has a cause?(2) Whether it has an internal cause?(3) Whether it has an external cause?(4) Whether one sin is
- 299 Reply Obj. 2: Sin is something imperfect on account of its moral imperfection on the part of its inordinateness. Nevertheless, as an act it can have natural perfection: and thus it can be the cause of another sin.Reply Obj. 3: Not every cause of one sin i
- 300 Reply Obj. 1: Not every ignorance causes involuntariness, as stated above (Q. 6, A. 8). Hence not every ignorance excuses from sin altogether.Reply Obj. 2: So far as voluntariness remains in the ignorant person, the intention of sin remains in him: so tha