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Summa Theologica Novel Chapters
List of most recent chapters published for the Summa Theologica novel. A total of 816 chapters have been translated and the release date of the last chapter is Apr 02, 2024
Latest Release: Chapter 1 : Summa Theologica.Part I (Prima Pars).by Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Wh
Summa Theologica.Part I (Prima Pars).by Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Whether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is Required?Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For ma
- 101 Reply Obj. 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each quality is good in itself. To those, howe
- 102 Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. For it is said (Gen. 1:2): "The earth was void and empty," or "invisible and shapeless," according to another version [*Septuagint]; by which is und
- 103 _On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): "Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time."_I answer that,_ It is commonly said that the first things created were these four--the angelic nature, the emp
- 104 Reply Obj. 2: It is accidental to light not to have a contrary, forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause of change, which is itself removed from contrariety.Reply Obj. 3: As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire, as an i
- 105 SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 2]Whether There Are Waters Above the Firmament?Objection 1: It would seem that there are not waters above the firmament. For water is heavy by nature, and heavy things tend naturally downwards, not upwards. Therefore there a
- 106 (1) About the gathering together of the waters.(2) About the production of plants._______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 69, Art. 1]Whether It Was Fitting That the Gathering Together of the Waters Should Take Place, As Recorded, on the Third Day?Obj
- 107 Obj. 4: Further, plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes effect in the order of nature.The lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth day, but on the third day.Obj. 5: Further, as astrono
- 108 Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production of every kind of fishes and birds since we find that
- 109 Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d did act on the seventh day, not by creating new creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work proper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the _second_ perfection. So that, according to our version of the Scrip
- 110 Obj. 3: Further, on the seventh day G.o.d ceased from all new works.If, then, the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it follows that He did not make that day; which is not admissible.Obj. 4: Further, the entire work ascribed to one day G.o.d per
- 111 Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved.First, because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, wha
- 112 Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things are in actuality partic.i.p.ate of the First Act, which is G.o.d; by partic.i.p.ation of Whom, all things are good, a
- 113 FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 1]Whether the Intellectual Principle Is United to the Body As Its Form?Objection 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that the intellect
- 114 Reply Obj. 6: Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species._______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 3]Whether Besides the Intellectual Soul There Are in Man Other Souls Essentially Different from One Anothe
- 115 Reply Obj. 1: Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer does not seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; other
- 116 OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL (In Eight Articles) We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under the first head there are eight points of in
- 117 Therefore the powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects._I answer that,_ A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, and consequently the nature of a power
- 118 Obj. 3: Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite; but everything arises from that which is like it in species. Now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species.Therefore one of them does not proceed from another._O
- 119 Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described--namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative. For these are called "natural" forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. Th
- 120 Reply Obj. 3: As one power arises from the soul by means of another, as we have seen above (Q. 77, A. 7), so also the soul is the subject of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the memory are called pa.s.sions of the "first sen
- 121 Obj. 3: Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the pa.s.sive intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now
- 122 SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 7]Whether the Intellectual Memory Is a Power Distinct from the Intellect?Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) a.s.signs to the soul memory, u
- 123 Reply Obj. 2: Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to G.o.d, for it belongs to G.o.d to u
- 124 _On the contrary,_ The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the appet.i.tive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes the appet.i.tive from the cognitive powers._I answer that,_ It is necessary to a.s.sign an appet.
- 125 Obj. 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appet.i.tes resist reason: according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore
- 126 Obj. 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects the will--namely, charity--is more n.o.ble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:2): "
- 127 Reply Obj. 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of anot
- 128 (3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it.In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points to be considered: (1) Through what does the soul know them?(2) How and in what order does it know them?(3) What does i
- 129 Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by G.o.d under the forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul created by G.o.d under intelligible
- 130 According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the pa.s.sive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellec
- 131 Reply Obj. 1: Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does not exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way of simple and absolute consideration; thus w
- 132 Reply Obj. 1: The intellect is above that time, which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things. But the mult.i.tude itself of intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one operation succeeds anoth
- 133 Reply Obj. 3: The likeness through which we understand is the species of the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not on account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on account of the power's apt.i.tude for the object
- 134 _I answer that,_ We must apply the same distinction to future things, as we applied above (A. 3) to contingent things. For future things considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect knows them by reflection only, as stated above (A.
- 135 Reply Obj. 1: The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, _being_ and _the true,_ in which the act also of understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our int
- 136 Therefore we can be led by material things to know immaterial substances.Obj. 2: Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene defines an angel (De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find
- 137 SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 2]Whether the Separated Soul Understands Separate Substances?Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the body than when existing
- 138 SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 6]Whether the Act of Knowledge Acquired Here Remains in the Separated Soul?Objection 1: It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), th
- 139 _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 1]Whether the Soul Was Made or Was of G.o.d's Substance?Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not made, but was G.o.d's substance. For it is written (Gen. 2:7): "G.o.d formed man
- 140 THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES) We have now to consider the production of the first man's body. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The matter from which it was produced; (2) The author by whom it was pro
- 141 Objection 1: It would seem that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made by G.o.d, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, "G.o.d said; Let i
- 142 Obj. 3: Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it._On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:22): "G.o.d built
- 143 Obj. 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom.iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of
- 144 Obj. 3: Further, an image seems to apply princ.i.p.ally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of G.o.d is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind.Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. x
- 145 Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between "likeness" and "image.&quo
- 146 _I answer that,_ In the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since G.o.d created things not only for their own existence, but also t
- 147 Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in the same pa.s.sage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now," who are admitted
- 148 We next consider the masters.h.i.+p which belonged to man in the state of innocence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?(2) Whether he was master over all creatures?(3) W
- 149 But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of masters.h.i.+p would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons. First, because man is na
- 150 _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 4]Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Acquired Immortality by the Tree of Life?Objection 1: It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act
- 151 (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth?(2) Whether all infants would have been of the male s.e.x?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 99, Art. 1]Whether in the State of Innocen
- 152 Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus h.o.m.o i, 18): "If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more." Therefor
- 153 Obj. 2: Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise (Gen. 2:10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.Obj. 3: Further, al
- 154 Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there are eight
- 155 _On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "G.o.d contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government._I answer t
- 156 _On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine
- 157 Obj. 2: Further, by His goodness G.o.d is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because G.o.d is good, we exist." But G.o.d cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; w
- 158 _On the contrary,_ G.o.d produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gen.1:9 "Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore G.o.d alone can move a body immedia
- 159 _On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "G.o.d sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature."_I answer that,_ From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a pr
- 160 _On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the angels of the first hierarchy."_I answer that,_ One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we mus
- 161 (5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 1]Whether One Angel Speaks to Another?Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to another.For Gregory says (Moral. xv
- 162 _On the contrary,_ One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels._I answer that,_ As above explained (AA. 1, 2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept ref
- 163 _I answer that,_ Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few p
- 164 Obj. 2: Further, the nearer an order is to G.o.d, the higher it is. But the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to G.o.d; for nothing is nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is the highest.Obj. 3: Furt
- 165 Obj. 2: Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy.But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy princ.i.p.ality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders.Obj. 3: Further, the d
- 166 Whether the Corporeal Creature Is Governed by the Angels?Objection 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require
- 167 Reply Obj. 3: Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.Reply Obj. 4: Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do
- 168 _I answer that,_ Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows. For it was said above (Q. 110, A. 3), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatev
- 169 Reply Obj. 2: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order; but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal sense, because he came to
- 170 111, A. 1).Reply Obj. 3: As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful pa.s.sion, so also do they depart from the instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hen
- 171 Whether the Angel Guardian Ever Forsakes a Man?Objection 1: It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer. 51:9) in the person of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she
- 172 Reply Obj. 2: In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained princ.i.p.ally through the grace of G.o.d, secondarily through the guardians.h.i.+p of the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings 6:1
- 173 From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved._______________________ QUESTION 115 OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (In Six Articles) We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certai
- 174 Obj. 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is pa.s.sive matter; and there are contrary agents--heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no ne
- 175 Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being _per se,_ has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one.For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, l
- 176 Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things t
- 177 THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 3]Whether Man by the Power of His Soul Can Change Corporeal Matter?Objection 1: It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work miracles somet
- 178 Whether the Intellectual Soul Is Produced from the s.e.m.e.n?Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the s.e.m.e.n. For it is written (Gen. 46:26): "All the souls that came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six."
- 179 Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain individ
- 180 Summa Theologica.Part II (Pars Prima Secundae).by Saint Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 1]Whether It Belongs to Man to Act for an End?Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally firs
- 181 QUESTION 2 OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (In Eight Articles) We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whet
- 182 Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from G.o.d, with His Angels. Hence it is written (Mk. 8:38): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels" [
- 183 In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appet.i.te, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inher
- 184 Obj. 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation._On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (E
- 185 according to _Ethic._ ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful to him.Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought princ.i.p.ally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect
- 186 (5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?(7) Whether any external goods are necessary?(8) Whether the fellows.h.i.+p of friends is necessary?________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II
- 187 Reply Obj. 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection, such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due
- 188 EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 8]Whether the Fellows.h.i.+p of Friends Is Necessary for Happiness?Objection 1: It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness.For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the name of "glor
- 189 Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written (Ps. 118:1): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life.Obj
- 190 Reply Obj. 3: A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the First Part (Q.106, A. 1): since in order to see this, all ar
- 191 Reply Obj. 1: Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore, although it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be ca
- 192 Secondly, according to a pa.s.sive principle; because, to wit, there is in nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle: thus the movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by reason of the natural apt.i.tude in a heavenly bo
- 193 Objection 1: It would seem that a circ.u.mstance is not an accident of a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a circ.u.mstance is that from "which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument." But oratorical arguments
- 194 QUESTION 8 OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS (In Three Articles) We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being elicited by the will; secondly, those acts
- 195 The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what has been said above (A. 2, ad 2). For the useful and the righteous are not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and that which is for the sake o
- 196 Reply Obj. 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object: whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end.________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE
- 197 Whether the Will Is Moved to Anything Naturally?Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary agent, as stated at the beginning of _Phys._ ii, 1. Therefore the will is n
- 198 QUESTION 11 OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (In Four Articles) We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appet.i.tive power?(2) Whether it belongs to
- 199 Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed._On the contrary,_ "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this is possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our p
- 200 _I answer that,_ The expression "two things" may be taken in two ways: they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if they be ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been said, that a man can intend several things a