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Summa Theologica Novel Chapters
List of most recent chapters published for the Summa Theologica novel. A total of 816 chapters have been translated and the release date of the last chapter is Apr 02, 2024
Latest Release: Chapter 1 : Summa Theologica.Part I (Prima Pars).by Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Wh
Summa Theologica.Part I (Prima Pars).by Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Whether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is Required?Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For ma
- 116 OF THOSE THINGS WHICH BELONG TO THE POWERS OF THE SOUL IN GENERAL (In Eight Articles) We proceed to consider those things which belong to the powers of the soul; first, in general, secondly, in particular. Under the first head there are eight points of in
- 115 Reply Obj. 1: Perhaps someone might attempt to answer this by saying that before sin the human body was incorruptible. This answer does not seem sufficient; because before sin the human body was immortal not by nature, but by a gift of Divine grace; other
- 114 Reply Obj. 6: Augustine denies a plurality of souls, that would involve a plurality of species._______________________ THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 3]Whether Besides the Intellectual Soul There Are in Man Other Souls Essentially Different from One Anothe
- 113 FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 76, Art. 1]Whether the Intellectual Principle Is United to the Body As Its Form?Objection 1: It seems that the intellectual principle is not united to the body as its form. For the Philosopher says (De Anima iii, 4) that the intellect
- 112 Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things are in actuality partic.i.p.ate of the First Act, which is G.o.d; by partic.i.p.ation of Whom, all things are good, a
- 111 Objection 1: It would seem that the soul is a body. For the soul is the moving principle of the body. Nor does it move unless moved.First, because seemingly nothing can move unless it is itself moved, since nothing gives what it has not; for instance, wha
- 110 Obj. 3: Further, on the seventh day G.o.d ceased from all new works.If, then, the seventh day is distinct from the other days, it follows that He did not make that day; which is not admissible.Obj. 4: Further, the entire work ascribed to one day G.o.d per
- 109 Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d did act on the seventh day, not by creating new creatures, but by directing and moving His creatures to the work proper to them, and thus He made some beginning of the _second_ perfection. So that, according to our version of the Scrip
- 108 Objection 1: It would seem that this work is not fittingly described.For the waters produce that which the power of water suffices to produce. But the power of water does not suffice for the production of every kind of fishes and birds since we find that
- 107 Obj. 4: Further, plants are an effect of the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies. Now, cause precedes effect in the order of nature.The lights, therefore, ought not to have been produced on the fourth day, but on the third day.Obj. 5: Further, as astrono
- 106 (1) About the gathering together of the waters.(2) About the production of plants._______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 69, Art. 1]Whether It Was Fitting That the Gathering Together of the Waters Should Take Place, As Recorded, on the Third Day?Obj
- 105 SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 68, Art. 2]Whether There Are Waters Above the Firmament?Objection 1: It would seem that there are not waters above the firmament. For water is heavy by nature, and heavy things tend naturally downwards, not upwards. Therefore there a
- 104 Reply Obj. 2: It is accidental to light not to have a contrary, forasmuch as it is the natural quality of the first corporeal cause of change, which is itself removed from contrariety.Reply Obj. 3: As heat acts towards perfecting the form of fire, as an i
- 103 _On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. i, 3): "Both spiritual and corporeal creatures were created at the beginning of time."_I answer that,_ It is commonly said that the first things created were these four--the angelic nature, the emp
- 102 Objection 1: It would seem that formlessness of matter preceded in time its formation. For it is said (Gen. 1:2): "The earth was void and empty," or "invisible and shapeless," according to another version [*Septuagint]; by which is und
- 101 Reply Obj. 2: Corporeal creatures according to their nature are good, though this good is not universal, but partial and limited, the consequence of which is a certain opposition of contrary qualities, though each quality is good in itself. To those, howe
- 100 Reply Obj. 1: The good and wicked angels have free-will, but according to the manner and condition of their state, as has been said.Reply Obj. 2: G.o.d's mercy delivers from sin those who repent. But such as are not capable of repenting, cling immova
- 99 Reply Obj. 3: As was observed above (Q. 62, A. 6), an angel has nothing in him to r.e.t.a.r.d his action, and with his whole might he is moved to whatsoever he is moved, be it good or bad. Consequently since the highest angel had greater natural energy th
- 98 5). Consequently they would have become blessed at once; and so would never have sinned, which is false. It remains, then, that they sinned by inordinate action in their first instant._On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 1:31): "G.o.d saw all the t
- 97 Reply Obj. 1: In the angels there is no potentiality to natural existence. Yet there is potentiality in their intellective part, as regards their being inclined to this or the other object. In this respect there can be evil in them.Reply Obj. 2: The heave
- 96 Reply Obj. 2: All things which make up beat.i.tude are sufficient of themselves. But in order for them to exist, they presuppose the natural gifts; because no beat.i.tude is self-subsisting, except the uncreated beat.i.tude.Reply Obj. 3: There cannot be t
- 95 Reply Obj. 2: Every form inclines the subject after the mode of the subject's nature. Now it is the mode of an intellectual nature to be inclined freely towards the objects it desires. Consequently the movement of grace does not impose necessity; but
- 94 _On the contrary,_ Strabus, commenting on the text "In the beginning G.o.d created heaven and earth," says: "By heaven he does not mean the visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual firmament, which is not so s
- 93 _______________________ QUESTION 61 OF THE PRODUCTION OF THE ANGELS IN THE ORDER OF NATURAL BEING (In Four Articles) After dealing with the nature of the angels, their knowledge and will, it now remains for us to treat of their creation, or, speaking in a
- 92 _I answer that,_ There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice; because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of a principle. Wherefore, since nature is f
- 91 Objection 1: It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels.For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after taking counsel," while counsel is "a kin
- 90 Reply Obj. 2: The morning and evening knowledge belong to the day, that is, to the enlightened angels, who are quite apart from the darkness, that is, from the evil spirits. The good angels, while knowing the creature, do not adhere to it, for that would
- 89 All things, then, which can be known by one intelligible species, are known as one intelligible object, and therefore are understood simultaneously. But things known by various intelligible species, are apprehended as different intelligible objects.Conseq
- 88 Reply Obj. 1: In the present life one man's thought is not known by another owing to a twofold hindrance; namely, on account of the grossness of the body, and because the will shuts up its secrets.The first obstacle will be removed at the Resurrectio
- 87 FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 57, Art. 1]Whether the Angels Know Material Things?Objection 1: It would seem that the angels do not know material things. For the object understood is the perfection of him who understands it. But material things cannot be the perfec
- 86 (2) Does one angel know another?(3) Does the angel know G.o.d by his own natural principles?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 56, Art 1]Whether an Angel Knows Himself?Objection 1: It would seem that an angel does not know himself. For Dionysius
- 85 A twofold answer can be returned to the contrary objections. First, it may be replied that those authorities are speaking according to the opinion of such men as contended that angels and demons have bodies naturally united to them. Augustine often makes
- 84 Obj. 3: Further, if the extremes be one, then the middle does not differ from them; because extreme is farther from extreme than the middle is. But in an angel the intellect and the object understood are the same, at least in so far as he understands his
- 83 _On the contrary,_ It is the same thing for a beatified angel to be moved as for a beatified soul to be moved. But it must necessarily be said that a blessed soul is moved locally, because it is an article of faith that Christ's soul descended into h
- 82 (2) Can he be in several places at once?(3) Can several angels be in the same place?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 52, Art. 1]Whether an Angel Is in a Place?Objection 1: It would seem that an angel is not in a place. For Boethius says (De He
- 81 Under the first heading there are three points of inquiry: (1) Whether angels have bodies naturally united to them?(2) Whether they a.s.sume bodies?(3) Whether they exercise functions of life in the bodies a.s.sumed?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [
- 80 Reply Obj. 3: Although there is no composition of matter and form in an angel, yet there is act and potentiality. And this can be made evident if we consider the nature of material things which contain a twofold composition. The first is that of form and
- 79 Thirdly, because the very nature of evil is against the idea of a first principle; both because every evil is caused by good, as was shown above (A. 1), and because evil can be only an accidental cause, and thus it cannot be the first cause, for the accid
- 78 Reply Obj. 1: Although fault results in pain, as merit in reward, yet fault is not intended on account of the pain, as merit is for the reward; but rather, on the contrary, pain is brought about so that the fault may be avoided, and thus fault is worse th
- 77 Objection 1: It would seem that evil is not in good as its subject.For good is something that exists. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 4) that "evil does not exist, nor is it in that which exists."Therefore, evil is not in good as its subject.O
- 76 But it is better for there to be many worlds than one, because many good things are better than a few. Therefore many worlds have been made by G.o.d.Obj. 3: Further, everything which has a form in matter can be multiplied in number, the species remaining
- 75 Obj. 3: Further, even time itself is created. But time cannot be created in the beginning of time, since time is divisible, and the beginning of time is indivisible. Therefore, the creation of things was not in the beginning of time._On the contrary,_ It
- 74 Obj. 9: Further, if there is a sufficient cause, there is an effect; for a cause to which there is no effect is an imperfect cause, requiring something else to make the effect follow. But G.o.d is the sufficient cause of the world; being the final cause,
- 73 Reply Obj. 1: The processions of the divine Persons are the cause of creation, as above explained.Reply Obj. 2: As the divine nature, although common to the three Persons, still belongs to them in a kind of order, inasmuch as the Son receives the divine n
- 72 Reply Obj. 3: In things which are made without movement, to become and to be already made are simultaneous, whether such making is the term of movement, as illumination (for a thing is being illuminated and is illuminated at the same time) or whether it i
- 71 For we abstract universal ideas by force of the active intellect from the particular conditions; but it is not necessary that the universals should exist outside the particulars in order to be their exemplars.Reply Obj. 4: As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv)
- 70 (1) of the production of creatures; (2) of the distinction between them; (3) of their preservation and government.Concerning the first point there are three things to be considered: (1) the first cause of beings; (2) the mode of procession of creatures fr
- 69 Reply Obj. 1: Although all the gifts, considered as such, are attributed to the Holy Ghost, forasmuch as He is by His nature the first Gift, since He is Love, as stated above (Q. 38, A. 1), some gifts nevertheless, by reason of their own particular nature
- 68 Reply Obj. 1: Mission implies inferiority in the one sent, when it means procession from the sender as principle, by command or counsel; forasmuch as the one commanding is the greater, and the counsellor is the wiser. In G.o.d, however, it means only proc
- 67 Obj. 3: Further, wherever there exist a whole and a part, many parts are more than one only, or than fewer parts; as three men are more than two, or than one. But in G.o.d a universal whole exists, and a part; for under relation or notion, several notions
- 66 (4) Whether the divine persons are equal in greatness?(5) Whether the one divine person is in another?(6) Whether they are equal in power?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 42, Art. 1]Whether There Is Equality in G.o.d?Objection 1: It would seem
- 65 Reply Obj. 4: When we say "Wisdom was created," this may be understood not of Wisdom which is the Son of G.o.d, but of created wisdom given by G.o.d to creatures: for it is said, "He created her [namely, Wisdom] in the Holy Ghost, and He po
- 64 We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts, concerning which six points of inquiry arise: (1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?(2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?(3) Whether as regards these
- 63 Others, therefore, considering this ident.i.ty, said that the properties were indeed the persons; but not "in" the persons; for, they said, there are no properties in G.o.d except in our way of speaking, as stated above (Q. 32, A. 2). We must, h
- 62 Obj. 2: Further, the essential attributes expressed in the abstract signify by mode of form. But one person is not as a form to another; since a form is not distinguished in subject from that of which it is the form. Therefore the essential attributes, es
- 61 _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 39, Art. 4]Whether the Concrete Essential Names Can Stand for the Person?Objection 1: It would seem that the concrete, essential names cannot stand for the person, so that we can truly say "G.o.d begot G.
- 60 (3) Whether essential names should be predicated of the persons in the plural, or in the singular?(4) Whether notional adjectives, or verbs, or participles, can be predicated of the essential names taken in a concrete sense?(5) Whether the same can be pre
- 59 Obj. 3: Further, by the same love the Father loves the Son, and Himself, and us. But the Father does not love Himself by the Holy Ghost; for no notional act is reflected back on the principle of the act; since it cannot be said that the "Father beget
- 58 Reply Obj. 3: As the begetting of the Son is co-eternal with the begetter (and hence the Father does not exist before begetting the Son), so the procession of the Holy Ghost is co-eternal with His principle. Hence, the Son was not begotten before the Holy
- 57 FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 36, Art. 1]Whether This Name "Holy Ghost" Is the Proper Name of One Divine Person?Objection 1: It would seem that this name, "Holy Ghost," is not the proper name of one divine person. For no name which is common to
- 56 _On the contrary,_ Augustine says (QQ. lx.x.xiii, qu. 63), that "the name Word signifies not only relation to the Father, but also relation to those beings which are made through the Word, by His operative power."_I answer that,_ Word implies re
- 55 _______________________ QUESTION 34 OF THE PERSON OF THE SON (In Three Articles) We next consider the person of the Son. Three names are attributed to the Son--namely, "Son," "Word," and "Image." The idea of Son is gathered f
- 54 Obj. 3: Further, the word principle is taken from priority. But in G.o.d there is no "before" and "after," as Athanasius says. Therefore in speaking of G.o.d we ought not to used the term principle._On the contrary,_ Augustine says (De
- 53 Obj. 3: Further, we do not require to presuppose any abstract notions as principles of knowing things which are devoid of composition: for they are known of themselves. But the divine persons are supremely simple. Therefore we are not to suppose any notio
- 52 Objection 1: It would seem that the exclusive word "alone" [solus] is not to be added to an essential term in G.o.d. For, according to the Philosopher (Elench. ii, 3), "He is alone who is not with another."But G.o.d is with the angels
- 51 _I answer that,_ The very mode of expression itself shows that this term "person" is common to the three when we say "three persons"; for when we say "three men" we show that "man" is common to the three.Now it is c
- 50 Obj. 3: Further, Boethius says of G.o.d (De Trin. i), that "this is truly one which has no number." But plurality implies number.Therefore there are not several persons in G.o.d.Obj. 4: Further, where number is, there is whole and part. Thus, if
- 49 Reply Obj. 3: Strictly speaking, the essence is what is expressed by the definition. Now, the definition comprises the principles of the species, but not the individual principles. Hence in things composed of matter and form, the essence signifies not onl
- 48 i, 1) it follows that a real relation in G.o.d can be based only on action. Such relations are not based on the actions of G.o.d according to any extrinsic procession, forasmuch as the relations of G.o.d to creatures are not real in Him (Q. 13, A. 7). Hen
- 47 (3) Whether in G.o.d there can be several relations distinct from each other?(4) The number of these relations._______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 28, Art. 1]Whether There Are Real Relations in G.o.d?Objection 1: It would seem that there are no r
- 46 Nothing of all this belongs to G.o.d. Therefore generation cannot exist in G.o.d.Obj. 2: Further, procession exists in G.o.d, according to an intelligible mode, as above explained (A. 1). But such a process is not called generation in us; therefore neithe
- 45 Reply Obj. 1: This argument proves that beat.i.tude belongs to G.o.d; not that beat.i.tude pertains essentially to Him under the aspect of His essence; but rather under the aspect of His intellect.Reply Obj. 2: Since beat.i.tude is a good, it is the objec
- 44 Reply Obj. 1: Although it is impossible accidentally for the past not to have been, if one considers the past thing itself, as, for instance, the running of Socrates; nevertheless, if the past thing is considered as past, that it should not have been is i
- 43 Whether There Is Power in G.o.d?Objection 1: It seems that power is not in G.o.d. For as primary matter is to power, so G.o.d, who is the first agent, is to act. But primary matter, considered in itself, is devoid of all act. Therefore, the first agent--n
- 42 We now consider the book of life; concerning which there are three points of inquiry: (1) What is the book of life?(2) Of what life is it the book?(3) Whether anyone can be blotted out of the book of life?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 24, A
- 41 Others said that pre-existing merits in this life are the reason and cause of the effect of predestination. For the Pelagians taught that the beginning of doing well came from us; and the consummation from G.o.d: so that it came about that the effect of p
- 40 Reply Obj. 2: Irrational creatures are not capable of that end which exceeds the faculty of human nature. Whence they cannot be properly said to be predestined; although improperly the term is used in respect of any other end.Reply Obj. 3: Predestination
- 39 Hence all things that exist in whatsoever manner are necessarily directed by G.o.d towards some end; as the Apostle says: "Those things that are of G.o.d are well ordered [*Vulg. 'Those powers that are, are ordained of G.o.d': 'Quae au
- 38 _I answer that,_ Mercy is especially to be attributed to G.o.d, as seen in its effect, but not as an affection of pa.s.sion. In proof of which it must be considered that a person is said to be merciful [misericors], as being, so to speak, sorrowful at hea
- 37 Therefore G.o.d does not always love more the better things.Obj. 5: Further, the just man who is foreknown is better than the predestined sinner. Now G.o.d loves more the predestined sinner, since He wills for him a greater good, life eternal. Therefore G
- 36 G.o.d'S LOVE (In Four Articles) We next consider those things that pertain absolutely to the will of G.o.d. In the appet.i.tive part of the soul there are found in ourselves both the pa.s.sions of the soul, as joy, love, and the like; and the habits
- 35 _On the contrary,_ All good things that exist G.o.d wills to be. If therefore His will imposes necessity on things willed, it follows that all good happens of necessity; and thus there is an end of free will, counsel, and all other such things._I answer t
- 34 This can be shown in three ways: First, from the order itself of active causes. Since both intellect and nature act for an end, as proved in _Phys._ ii, 49, the natural agent must have the end and the necessary means predetermined for it by some higher in
- 33 Objection 1: It seems that there is not will in G.o.d. For the object of will is the end and the good. But we cannot a.s.sign to G.o.d any end.Therefore there is not will in G.o.d.Obj. 2: Further, will is a kind of appet.i.te. But appet.i.te, as it is dir
- 32 Reply Obj. 1: The Philosopher here takes "to live" to mean an operation of life. Or it would be better to say that sensation and intelligence and the like, are sometimes taken for the operations, sometimes for the existence itself of the operato
- 31 Whether Falsity Is in the Intellect?Objection 1: It seems that falsity is not in the intellect. For Augustine says (Qq. lx.x.xiii, 32), "Everyone who is deceived, understands not that in which he is deceived." But falsity is said to exist in any
- 30 Objection 1: It seems that truth is immutable. For Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 12), that "Truth and mind do not rank as equals, otherwise truth would be mutable, as the mind is."Obj. 2: Further, what remains after every change is immutabl
- 29 1). It may, however, be said that being also is in things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in the intellect, while being is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea.Reply Obj. 2: Not-being
- 28 Therefore there are not in G.o.d ideas of all things known by Him.Obj. 3: Further, G.o.d knows primary matter, of which there can be no idea, since it has no form. Hence the same conclusion.Obj. 4: Further, it is certain that G.o.d knows not only species,
- 27 SIXTEENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 16]Whether G.o.d Has a Speculative Knowledge of Things?Objection 1: It seems that G.o.d has not a speculative knowledge of things. For the knowledge of G.o.d is the cause of things, as shown above (A. 8). But speculative
- 26 as the Philosopher says (Phys. iii). Moreover, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xii) that "whatever is comprehended by knowledge, is bounded by the comprehension of the knower." Now infinite things have no boundary. Therefore they cannot be comprehen
- 25 Obj. 2: Further, given the cause, the effect follows. But the knowledge of G.o.d is eternal. Therefore if the knowledge of G.o.d is the cause of things created, it seems that creatures are eternal.Obj. 3: Further, "The thing known is prior to knowled
- 24 _I answer that,_ It must be said that the act of G.o.d's intellect is His substance. For if His act of understanding were other than His substance, then something else, as the Philosopher says (Metaph.xii), would be the act and perfection of the divi
- 23 (6) Whether He has a proper knowledge of them?(7) Whether the knowledge of G.o.d is discursive?(8) Whether the knowledge of G.o.d is the cause of things?(9) Whether G.o.d has knowledge of non-existing things?(10) Whether He has knowledge of evil?(11) Whet
- 22 Whether This Name "G.o.d" Is Applied to G.o.d Univocally by Nature, by Partic.i.p.ation, and According to Opinion?Objection 1: It seems that this name "G.o.d" is applied to G.o.d univocally by nature, by partic.i.p.ation, and according
- 21 SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 13, Art. 7]Whether Names Which Imply Relation to Creatures Are Predicated of G.o.d Temporally?Objection 1: It seems that names which imply relation to creatures are not predicated of G.o.d temporally. For all such names signify the
- 20 Whether Any Name Can Be Applied to G.o.d in Its Literal Sense?Objection 1: It seems that no name is applied literally to G.o.d. For all names which we apply to G.o.d are taken from creatures; as was explained above (A. 1). But the names of creatures are a
- 19 Now in both of these, human knowledge is a.s.sisted by the revelation of grace. For the intellect's natural light is strengthened by the infusion of gratuitous light; and sometimes also the images in the human imagination are divinely formed, so as t
- 18 _On the contrary,_ A mirror and what is in it are seen by means of one likeness. But all things are seen in G.o.d as in an intelligible mirror.Therefore if G.o.d Himself is not seen by any similitude but by His own essence, neither are the things seen in
- 17 Therefore if the essence of G.o.d is seen through any created light, such a light can be made natural to some other creature; and thus, that creature would not need any other light to see G.o.d; which is impossible. Therefore it is not necessary that ever