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Summa Theologica Novel Chapters
List of most recent chapters published for the Summa Theologica novel. A total of 816 chapters have been translated and the release date of the last chapter is Apr 02, 2024
Latest Release: Chapter 1 : Summa Theologica.Part I (Prima Pars).by Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Wh
Summa Theologica.Part I (Prima Pars).by Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 1, Art. 1]Whether, besides Philosophy, any Further Doctrine Is Required?Objection 1: It seems that, besides philosophical science, we have no need of any further knowledge. For ma
- 216 _On the contrary,_ The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries. But good and evil are contraries. Therefore the same action cannot be both good and evil._On the contrary,_ The same thing cannot be the subject of contraries. But good and evil are co
- 215 Reply Obj. 1: If the good tree be taken to signify the good will, it must be in so far as the will derives goodness from the act willed and from the end intended.Reply Obj. 2: A man sins by his will, not only when he wills an evil end; but also when he wi
- 214 Objection 1: It would seem that the human will need not always be conformed to the Divine will, as regards the thing willed. For we cannot will what we know not: since the apprehended good is the object of the will. But in many things we know not what G.o
- 213 Obj. 3: Further, the will is evil when it is at variance with erring reason. If, therefore, the will is evil also when it abides by erring reason, it seems that the will is always evil when in conjunction with erring reason: so that in such a case a man w
- 212 Whether the goodness of the will depends on the object alone?Objection 1: It would seem that the goodness of the will does not depend on the object alone. For the end has a closer relations.h.i.+p to the will than to any other power. But the acts of the o
- 211 ________________________ TENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 10]Whether a Circ.u.mstance Places a Moral Action in the Species of Good or Evil?Objection 1: It would seem that a circ.u.mstance cannot place a moral action in the species of good or evil. For the
- 210 ________________________ SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 18, Art. 6]Whether an Action Has the Species of Good or Evil from Its End?Objection 1: It would seem that the good and evil which are from the end do not diversify the species of actions. For actions derive
- 209 Reply Obj. 3: An evil action can have a proper effect, according to the goodness and being that it has. Thus adultery is the cause of human generation, inasmuch as it implies union of male and female, but not inasmuch as it lacks the order of reason._____
- 208 EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 8]Whether the Act of the Vegetal Soul Is Commanded?Objection 1: It would seem that the acts of the vegetal soul are subject to the command of reason. For the sensitive powers are of higher rank than the vegetal powers. Bu
- 207 Whether Command and the Commanded Act Are One Act, or Distinct?Objection 1: It would seem that the commanded act is not one with the command itself. For the acts of different powers are themselves distinct. But the commanded act belongs to one power, and
- 206 QUESTION 17 OF THE ACTS COMMANDED BY THE WILL (In Nine Articles) We must now consider the acts commanded by the will; under which head there are nine points of inquiry: (1) Whether command is an act of the will or of the reason?(2) Whether command belongs
- 205 (2) Whether it is to be found in irrational animals?(3) Whether it regards the means only, or the end also?(4) Of the relation of use to choice.________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 16, Art. 1]Whether Use Is an Act of the Will?Objection 1: It w
- 204 Whether Consent Is an Act of the Appet.i.tive or of the Apprehensive Power?Objection 1: It would seem that consent belongs only to the apprehensive part of the soul. For Augustine (De Trin. xii, 12) ascribes consent to the higher reason. But the reason is
- 203 _I answer that,_ Counsel properly implies a conference held between several; the very word (_consilium_) denotes this, for it means a sitting together (_considium_), from the fact that many sit together in order to confer with one another. Now we must tak
- 202 SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 6]Whether Man Chooses of Necessity or Freely?Objection 1: It would seem that man chooses of necessity. For the end stands in relation to the object of choice, as the principle of that which follows from the principles, as
- 201 Reply Obj. 3: In speaking "of ignorance of choice," we do not mean that choice is a sort of knowledge, but that there is ignorance of what ought to be chosen.________________________ SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 13, Art. 2]Whether Choice Is to Be Fo
- 200 _I answer that,_ The expression "two things" may be taken in two ways: they may be ordained to one another or not so ordained. And if they be ordained to one another, it is evident, from what has been said, that a man can intend several things a
- 199 Therefore enjoyment is only of the end possessed._On the contrary,_ "to enjoy is to adhere lovingly to something for its own sake," as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 4). But this is possible, even in regard to a thing which is not in our p
- 198 QUESTION 11 OF ENJOYMENT [*Or, Fruition], WHICH IS AN ACT OF THE WILL (In Four Articles) We must now consider enjoyment: concerning which there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether to enjoy is an act of the appet.i.tive power?(2) Whether it belongs to
- 197 Whether the Will Is Moved to Anything Naturally?Objection 1: It would seem that the will is not moved to anything naturally. For the natural agent is condivided with the voluntary agent, as stated at the beginning of _Phys._ ii, 1. Therefore the will is n
- 196 Reply Obj. 3: The will is moved by the intellect, otherwise than by itself. By the intellect it is moved on the part of the object: whereas it is moved by itself, as to the exercise of its act, in respect of the end.________________________ FOURTH ARTICLE
- 195 The solution to the argument in the contrary sense is clear from what has been said above (A. 2, ad 2). For the useful and the righteous are not species of good in an equal degree, but are as that which is for its own sake and that which is for the sake o
- 194 QUESTION 8 OF THE WILL, IN REGARD TO WHAT IT WILLS (In Three Articles) We must now consider the different acts of the will; and in the first place, those acts which belong to the will itself immediately, as being elicited by the will; secondly, those acts
- 193 Objection 1: It would seem that a circ.u.mstance is not an accident of a human act. For Tully says (De Invent. Rhetor. i) that a circ.u.mstance is that from "which an orator adds authority and strength to his argument." But oratorical arguments
- 192 Secondly, according to a pa.s.sive principle; because, to wit, there is in nature an inclination to receive an action from an extrinsic principle: thus the movement of the heavens is said to be natural, by reason of the natural apt.i.tude in a heavenly bo
- 191 Reply Obj. 1: Not every principle is a first principle. Therefore, although it is essential to the voluntary act that its principle be within the agent, nevertheless it is not contrary to the nature of the voluntary act that this intrinsic principle be ca
- 190 Reply Obj. 3: A happy angel enlightens the intellect of a man or of a lower angel, as to certain notions of the Divine works: but not as to the vision of the Divine Essence, as was stated in the First Part (Q.106, A. 1): since in order to see this, all ar
- 189 Objection 1: It would seem that Happiness can be had in this life. For it is written (Ps. 118:1): "Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord." But this happens in this life. Therefore one can be happy in this life.Obj
- 188 EIGHTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 4, Art. 8]Whether the Fellows.h.i.+p of Friends Is Necessary for Happiness?Objection 1: It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness.For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the name of "glor
- 187 Reply Obj. 3: Not everything that is ordained to the end, ceases with the getting of the end: but only that which involves imperfection, such as movement. Hence the instruments of movement are no longer necessary when the end has been gained: but the due
- 186 (5) Whether the body is necessary for man's happiness?(6) Whether any perfection of the body is necessary?(7) Whether any external goods are necessary?(8) Whether the fellows.h.i.+p of friends is necessary?________________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I-II
- 185 according to _Ethic._ ix, 8, and x, 7, therefore such an operation is most proper to man and most delightful to him.Secondly, it is evident from the fact that contemplation is sought princ.i.p.ally for its own sake. But the act of the practical intellect
- 184 Obj. 6: Further, happiness is in the happy one uninterruptedly. But human operation is often interrupted; for instance, by sleep, or some other occupation, or by cessation. Therefore happiness is not an operation._On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (E
- 183 In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appet.i.te, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inher
- 182 Reply Obj. 1: The Apostle speaks, then, not of the glory which is with men, but of the glory which is from G.o.d, with His Angels. Hence it is written (Mk. 8:38): "The Son of Man shall confess him in the glory of His Father, before His angels" [
- 181 QUESTION 2 OF THOSE THINGS IN WHICH MAN'S HAPPINESS CONSISTS (In Eight Articles) We have now to consider happiness: and (1) in what it consists; (2) what it is; (3) how we can obtain it.Concerning the first there are eight points of inquiry: (1) Whet
- 180 Summa Theologica.Part II (Pars Prima Secundae).by Saint Thomas Aquinas.FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 1, Art. 1]Whether It Belongs to Man to Act for an End?Objection 1: It would seem that it does not belong to man to act for an end. For a cause is naturally firs
- 179 Now there are certain things whose form cannot exist but in one individual matter: thus the form of the sun cannot exist save in the matter in which it actually is. And in this sense some have said that the human form cannot exist but in a certain individ
- 178 Whether the Intellectual Soul Is Produced from the s.e.m.e.n?Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual soul is produced from the s.e.m.e.n. For it is written (Gen. 46:26): "All the souls that came out of [Jacob's] thigh, sixty-six."
- 177 THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 117, Art. 3]Whether Man by the Power of His Soul Can Change Corporeal Matter?Objection 1: It would seem that man by the power of his soul can change corporeal matter. For Gregory says (Dialog. ii, 30): "Saints work miracles somet
- 176 Objection 1: It seems that all things are subject to fate. For Boethius says (De Consol. iv): "The chain of fate moves the heaven and the stars, tempers the elements to one another, and models them by a reciprocal transformation. By fate all things t
- 175 Therefore we must say, in the second place, that everything that is a being _per se,_ has a cause; but what is accidentally, has not a cause, because it is not truly a being, since it is not truly one.For (that a thing is) "white" has a cause, l
- 174 Obj. 2: Further, for the production of anything, an agent and matter suffice. But in things here below there is pa.s.sive matter; and there are contrary agents--heat and cold, and the like. Therefore for the production of things here below, there is no ne
- 173 From what has been said, the objections can easily be solved._______________________ QUESTION 115 OF THE ACTION OF THE CORPOREAL CREATURE (In Six Articles) We have now to consider the action of the corporeal creature; and fate, which is ascribed to certai
- 172 Reply Obj. 2: In order that the conditions of the fight be not unequal, there is as regards man the promised recompense, to be gained princ.i.p.ally through the grace of G.o.d, secondarily through the guardians.h.i.+p of the angels. Wherefore (4 Kings 6:1
- 171 Whether the Angel Guardian Ever Forsakes a Man?Objection 1: It would seem that the angel guardian sometimes forsakes the man whom he is appointed to guard. For it is said (Jer. 51:9) in the person of the angels: "We would have cured Babylon, but she
- 170 111, A. 1).Reply Obj. 3: As men depart from the natural instinct of good by reason of a sinful pa.s.sion, so also do they depart from the instigation of the good angels, which takes place invisibly when they enlighten man that he may do what is right. Hen
- 169 Reply Obj. 2: According to Dionysius (Coel. Hier. xiii), the angel who was sent to purify the prophet's lips was one of the inferior order; but was called a "Seraph," that is, "kindling " in an equivocal sense, because he came to
- 168 _I answer that,_ Both a good and a bad angel by their own natural power can move the human imagination. This may be explained as follows. For it was said above (Q. 110, A. 3), that corporeal nature obeys the angel as regards local movement, so that whatev
- 167 Reply Obj. 3: Spiritual powers are able to effect whatever happens in this visible world, by employing corporeal seeds by local movement.Reply Obj. 4: Although the angels can do something which is outside the order of corporeal nature, yet they cannot do
- 166 Whether the Corporeal Creature Is Governed by the Angels?Objection 1: It would seem that the corporeal creature is not governed by angels. For whatever possesses a determinate mode of action, needs not to be governed by any superior power; for we require
- 165 Obj. 2: Further, the angelic orders are contained under a hierarchy.But the demons are not in a hierarchy, which is defined as a holy princ.i.p.ality; for they are void of all holiness. Therefore among the demons there are no orders.Obj. 3: Further, the d
- 164 Obj. 2: Further, the nearer an order is to G.o.d, the higher it is. But the order of "Thrones" is the nearest to G.o.d; for nothing is nearer to the sitter than the seat. Therefore the order of the "Thrones" is the highest.Obj. 3: Furt
- 163 _I answer that,_ Whoever knows anything perfectly, is able to distinguish its acts, powers, and nature, down to the minutest details, whereas he who knows a thing in an imperfect manner can only distinguish it in a general way, and only as regards a few p
- 162 _On the contrary,_ One man can speak to another alone; much more can this be the case among the angels._I answer that,_ As above explained (AA. 1, 2), the mental concept of one angel can be perceived by another when the angel who possesses the concept ref
- 161 (5) Whether all the speech of one angel to another is known to all?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 107, Art. 1]Whether One Angel Speaks to Another?Objection 1: It would seem that one angel does not speak to another.For Gregory says (Moral. xv
- 160 _On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Coel. Hier. viii) that "the angels of the second hierarchy are cleansed, enlightened and perfected by the angels of the first hierarchy."_I answer that,_ One angel enlightens another. To make this clear, we mus
- 159 _On the contrary,_ Augustine says (Contra Faust. xxvi, 3): "G.o.d sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature."_I answer that,_ From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a pr
- 158 _On the contrary,_ G.o.d produced the works of the six days immediately among which is included the movements of bodies, as is clear from Gen.1:9 "Let the waters be gathered together into one place." Therefore G.o.d alone can move a body immedia
- 157 Obj. 2: Further, by His goodness G.o.d is the cause why things exist, since, as Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 32): "Because G.o.d is good, we exist." But G.o.d cannot cease to be good. Therefore He cannot cause things to cease to exist; w
- 156 _On the contrary,_ Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "There is nothing that can desire or is able to resist this sovereign good. It is this sovereign good therefore that ruleth all mightily and ordereth all sweetly," as is said (Wis. 8) of Divine
- 155 _On the contrary,_ Dionysius says (Div. Nom. xii): "G.o.d contains all and fills all by His providence and perfect goodness." But government belongs to providence. Therefore there are certain definite effects of the Divine government._I answer t
- 154 Having considered the creation of things and their distinction, we now consider in the third place the government thereof, and (1) the government of things in general; (2) in particular, the effects of this government. Under the first head there are eight
- 153 Obj. 2: Further, Scripture mentions four rivers as rising in paradise (Gen. 2:10). But the rivers there mentioned have visible sources elsewhere, as is clear from the Philosopher (Meteor. i). Therefore paradise is not a corporeal place.Obj. 3: Further, al
- 152 Obj. 2: Further, Anselm says (Cur Deus h.o.m.o i, 18): "If our first parents had lived so as not to yield to temptation, they would have been confirmed in grace, so that with their offspring they would have been unable to sin any more." Therefor
- 151 (1) Whether in the state of innocence children would have had full powers of the body immediately after birth?(2) Whether all infants would have been of the male s.e.x?_______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 99, Art. 1]Whether in the State of Innocen
- 150 _______________________ FOURTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 97, Art. 4]Whether in the State of Innocence Man Would Have Acquired Immortality by the Tree of Life?Objection 1: It would seem that the tree of life could not be the cause of immortality. For nothing can act
- 149 But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of masters.h.i.+p would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons. First, because man is na
- 148 We next consider the masters.h.i.+p which belonged to man in the state of innocence. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) Whether man in the state of innocence was master over the animals?(2) Whether he was master over all creatures?(3) W
- 147 Reply Obj. 2: As Augustine says in the same pa.s.sage, it is not disputed that Adam, like other just souls, was in some degree gifted with the Holy Ghost; but "he did not possess the Holy Ghost, as the faithful possess Him now," who are admitted
- 146 _I answer that,_ In the natural order, perfection comes before imperfection, as act precedes potentiality; for whatever is in potentiality is made actual only by something actual. And since G.o.d created things not only for their own existence, but also t
- 145 Wherefore, as the good can be compared to each individual thing both as its preamble, and as subsequent to it, as signifying some perfection in it, so also in the same way there exists a kind of comparison between "likeness" and "image.&quo
- 144 Obj. 3: Further, an image seems to apply princ.i.p.ally to the shape of a thing. But shape belongs to the body. Therefore the image of G.o.d is to be seen in man's body also, and not in his mind.Obj. 4: Further, according to Augustine (Gen. ad lit. x
- 143 Obj. 2: Further, the more distinct a likeness is, the nearer it approaches to the nature of an image. But Dionysius says (Div. Nom.iv) that "the solar ray has a very great similitude to the Divine goodness." Therefore it is made to the image of
- 142 Obj. 3: Further, a rib cannot be removed from man without pain. But there was no pain before sin. Therefore it was not right for a rib to be taken from the man, that Eve might be made from it._On the contrary,_ It is written (Gen. 2:22): "G.o.d built
- 141 Objection 1: It would seem that the production of the human body is not fittingly described in Scripture. For, as the human body was made by G.o.d, so also were the other works of the six days. But in the other works it is written, "G.o.d said; Let i
- 140 THE PRODUCTION OF THE FIRST MAN'S BODY (FOUR ARTICLES) We have now to consider the production of the first man's body. Under this head there are four points of inquiry: (1) The matter from which it was produced; (2) The author by whom it was pro
- 139 _______________________ FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 90, Art. 1]Whether the Soul Was Made or Was of G.o.d's Substance?Objection 1: It would seem that the soul was not made, but was G.o.d's substance. For it is written (Gen. 2:7): "G.o.d formed man
- 138 SIXTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 6]Whether the Act of Knowledge Acquired Here Remains in the Separated Soul?Objection 1: It would seem that the act of knowledge here acquired does not remain in the separated soul. For the Philosopher says (De Anima i, 4), th
- 137 SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 89, Art. 2]Whether the Separated Soul Understands Separate Substances?Objection 1: It would seem that the separated soul does not understand separate substances. For the soul is more perfect when joined to the body than when existing
- 136 Therefore we can be led by material things to know immaterial substances.Obj. 2: Further, science resides in the intellect. But there are sciences and definitions of immaterial substances; for Damascene defines an angel (De Fide Orth. ii, 3); and we find
- 135 Reply Obj. 1: The object of the intellect is something universal, namely, _being_ and _the true,_ in which the act also of understanding is comprised. Wherefore the intellect can understand its own act. But not primarily, since the first object of our int
- 134 _I answer that,_ We must apply the same distinction to future things, as we applied above (A. 3) to contingent things. For future things considered as subject to time are singular, and the human intellect knows them by reflection only, as stated above (A.
- 133 Reply Obj. 3: The likeness through which we understand is the species of the known in the knower; therefore a thing is known first, not on account of its natural likeness to the cognitive power, but on account of the power's apt.i.tude for the object
- 132 Reply Obj. 1: The intellect is above that time, which is the measure of the movement of corporeal things. But the mult.i.tude itself of intelligible species causes a certain vicissitude of intelligible operations, according as one operation succeeds anoth
- 131 Reply Obj. 1: Abstraction may occur in two ways: First, by way of composition and division; thus we may understand that one thing does not exist in some other, or that it is separate therefrom. Secondly, by way of simple and absolute consideration; thus w
- 130 According to this opinion, then, on the part of the phantasms, intellectual knowledge is caused by the senses. But since the phantasms cannot of themselves affect the pa.s.sive intellect, and require to be made actually intelligible by the active intellec
- 129 Obj. 2: Further, the intellectual soul is more excellent than corporeal primary matter. But primary matter was created by G.o.d under the forms to which it has potentiality. Therefore much more is the intellectual soul created by G.o.d under intelligible
- 128 (3) How it understands immaterial substances, which are above it.In treating of the knowledge of corporeal things there are three points to be considered: (1) Through what does the soul know them?(2) How and in what order does it know them?(3) What does i
- 127 Reply Obj. 3: Free-will is the cause of its own movement, because by his free-will man moves himself to act. But it does not of necessity belong to liberty that what is free should be the first cause of itself, as neither for one thing to be cause of anot
- 126 Obj. 3: Further, habits are proportioned to their powers, as perfections to what they make perfect. But the habit which perfects the will--namely, charity--is more n.o.ble than the habits which perfect the intellect: for it is written (1 Cor. 13:2): "
- 125 Obj. 2: Further, what obeys a certain thing does not resist it. But the irascible and concupiscible appet.i.tes resist reason: according to the Apostle (Rom. 7:23): "I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind." Therefore
- 124 _On the contrary,_ The Philosopher distinguishes (De Anima ii, 3) the appet.i.tive from the other powers. Damascene also (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) distinguishes the appet.i.tive from the cognitive powers._I answer that,_ It is necessary to a.s.sign an appet.
- 123 Reply Obj. 2: Boethius takes intelligence as meaning that act of the intellect which transcends the act of the reason. Wherefore he also says that reason alone belongs to the human race, as intelligence alone belongs to G.o.d, for it belongs to G.o.d to u
- 122 SEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 79, Art. 7]Whether the Intellectual Memory Is a Power Distinct from the Intellect?Objection 1: It would seem that the intellectual memory is distinct from the intellect. For Augustine (De Trin. x, 11) a.s.signs to the soul memory, u
- 121 Obj. 3: Further, the likeness of the agent is received into the patient according to the nature of the patient. But the pa.s.sive intellect is an immaterial power. Therefore its immaterial nature suffices for forms to be received into it immaterially. Now
- 120 Reply Obj. 3: As one power arises from the soul by means of another, as we have seen above (Q. 77, A. 7), so also the soul is the subject of one power through another. In this way the imagination and the memory are called pa.s.sions of the "first sen
- 119 Objection 1: It would seem that the parts of the vegetative soul are not fittingly described--namely, the nutritive, augmentative, and generative. For these are called "natural" forces. But the powers of the soul are above the natural forces. Th
- 118 Obj. 3: Further, one opposite does not arise from the other opposite; but everything arises from that which is like it in species. Now the powers of the soul are oppositely divided, as various species.Therefore one of them does not proceed from another._O
- 117 Therefore the powers are distinguished according to their acts and objects._I answer that,_ A power as such is directed to an act. Wherefore we seek to know the nature of a power from the act to which it is directed, and consequently the nature of a power